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Overcoming "Stigmas":
Lesbian and Gay Districts and
Black Electoral Empowerment

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, historically, members of racial and sexual
minority groups1 have been prevented from effectively participating in
governmental decisionmaking because the political districting system
denies them adequate representation in the political process. Follow* Associate, Flemming, Zulack & Williamson, LLP, New York, New York. B.A., 1991,
University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1995, University of Pennsylvania. This Article was written with
a companion article, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1996). Both articles benefitted from
inspiration and guidance from Professor Lani Guinier. Mary A. Inman's encouragement also
proved invaluable. For educating me in New York districting politics, I thank Judith Reed, Tom
Duane, Robert Bailey, Dick Dadey, Alan Gartner, and George Waffle, who assisted me in my
research on New York's 1991 districting. I thank Robert Bridges, Chris Luna, Glen Maxey,
Craig McDaniel, Annice Parker, and Dan Weizer for sharing their knowledge on Texas districting issues with me. I would also like to thank Alys I. Cohen. Scott B. Goldberg, Sarah Barringer
Gordon, Jonathan Houlon, Palisa Kelley, Darren Kowitt, Michael Phillips, Marc Stein, and Susan Sturm.
This article is dedicated to Judge Louis H. Pollak, who has enlightened so many with his
insight and kindness.
1. "Sexual minority" is a term that coven the traditionally recognized categories of lesbians and gays, as well as bisexuals, transsexual and transgendered people, and others who define
their identitv based on radical sexualities. "Racial minoritv" is a controversial term as well:
minorities aie a contingent phenomenon since the majority o i the world population is non-white.
of most maior
Even thoueh blacks, Latinos and Asians collectivelv form the maioritv
. ..uouulation
.
cities, thefare a nuherical minority in the unitedSStates. Because of the politically submerged
nature of the political power of people of color, however, the term "racial minority" still has
currency.
I use the terms "lesbian" and "gay" because of their currency. I will not use the term 'bisexual' alongside "lesbian" and "gay" because, although bisexuals participate integrally in lesbian
and gay political life, they do not have representation needs different from those of heterosexuals, lesbians, and gays. The term "queer" has been used to describe a broad range of sexual and
gender identities. See generally Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionaliry and the Failure of
Recent Lesbian and Gay Victories, 4 L. & S E X U A L I ~A: REVIEWOF LESBIAN& GAYLEGAL
ISSUES83 (1994). I will not, however, use the term "queer" in this article because its radicalism
implies a more critical relationship toward electoral power. .
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ing the 1990 census, blacks: in particular, saw significant gains in their
political representation as a result of redistricting, only to suffer a
sharp reduction of their voting rights with the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions in the Shaw3 and Miller" cases. Whereas voting rights litigation once explored ways to prevent minority vote dilution, today's jurisprudence focuses on the ramifications of the "stig~na"~
faced by
blacks in a majority-minority6 district and the "constitutional right to
participate in a 'colorblind' electoral pro~ess."~
Race-conscious districting provides blacks with some guarantee
of political presence in a country defined by the odious oppression of
black people. Legal scholars have challenged the putative virtue of
racelessness8 in a society fraught with racist political, economic, and
cultural realities-realities that race-consciousness accurately ref l e c t ~ As
. ~ one scholar phrases it, "[llegal discourse uses the language
of liberal 'colorblindness,' rather than that of racial inferiority, to undermine racial ref~rm."'~Even political boundaries, ostensibly raceless, anchor the political imbalance among the races." "Color-blind"
district lines can serve a similar function where the electorate is racially polarized, permitting whites to dominate political representation. Race-conscious districting reduces the systematic exclusion of
blacks from political power by whites.
In contrast to past judicial activism on behalf of black cornmunities, no laws or courts have attempted structurally to reverse the lack
of representation of lesbian and gay interests. Today, only seventy of
the nearly one-half million elected officials in the United States are
2. This article employs the term "black" because unlike "African American," it does not
exclude nowAmerican peoples of African heritage who may make up important constituencies.
Unfortunately, "black" lacks the potentially useful ethnic implications of "African American."
3. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
4. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
5. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2829.
6. "Majority-minority" indicates a majority of racial, ethnic, and language minorities but
does not include sexual minorities.
7. Id. at 2824.
8. Lani Guinier has wined the term "racelessness" to indicate the valorization of the absence of race.
9. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 Stan. L.J. 1
(1991); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on F o r d Equnl Opportunity,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
10. Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN.L.J. 747,752 (1994)
(reviewing KWAMEA m o m APPIAH,IN MY FATHER'SHOUSE: AFRICAIN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CULT&
(1992)).
11. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Annlysb, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) (examining the racial implications of political
boundaries).
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openly lesbian or gay.12 This underrepresentation is shocking even by
the most conservative estimates of the size of the lesbian and gay population.13 Despite the apparently systemic exclusion of lesbians and
gays from political representation, advocates have mobilized to establish some access for lesbian and gay candidates within the current districting system.14 Although no districting authority officially
recognizes lesbian and gay people as a group whose interests must be
met by districting schemes, lesbian and gay activists, using communitybased evidence, have, to some extent, succeeded in asserting districting claims.
This Article argues that the renewed disenfranchisement of
blacks from districting remedies may be curbed through the use of
community-based evidence similar to that used by lesbian and gay activists. Section One will explore the current position of blacks in the
districting system, scrutinizing recent changes in the law that deprive
blacks of their previously "protected" status under the Voting Rights
Act. In 1995, the Miller v. Johnsonls decision notably held that race
cannot be the predominant factor in the drawing of district lines.
Blacks wishing to ensure that their interests are represented in the
political process will therefore need to employ standards for creating
electoral districts that do not violate Miller. A close reading of the
Miller decision indicates that evidence of community cohesiveness,
rather than mere "hard" population statistics, would satisfy the Court.
Section Two will address the use of community-based evidence to
establish district lines reflecting lesbian and gay interests. An examination of the 1991 redistricting for the New York City council pro12. GAYAND LESBIAN
VICTORYFUND,OUTFOR Om-: CAMPAIGNING
IN THE GAY90's
xiii (Kathleen DeBold ed., 1994).
13. Estimates of the size of the lesbian and gay population in this country range from 1%
to 10% of the nation's total population. The 10% figure is based on one of Kinsey's landmark
studies of human sexuality. See generally ALFREDC. KINSEYET AL, SEX BEHAVIORIN THE
HUMANMALE(1948); A ~ E C.
D KINSEY ET AL, SEX BEHAVIORIN rn HUMANFEMALE
(1953). This 10% figure serves as a common reference point for quantifying lesbian and gay
communities. Others have used this figure as well for representation purposes. See, e.g., The
Care of the Missing Districrs, OUTWEEEK,
May 1, 1991, at 4 ("[Llesbians and gays, with at least
10 percent of the city's population, deserve at least five [of 51 seats on the City Council].").
One recent study by a prominent marketing firm revealed that approximately 6% of the
population is lesbian or gay. See Stuart Elliot, A Sharper View of Gay Consumers, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 1994, at Dl. This study also confirmed that lesbian and gay populations are regionally
concentrated. "[Lesbians and gays] are highly concentrated in the top 25 metropolitan markets."
Id.
14. This Article does not posit that sexual orientation serves as a marker for political fidelity to lesbian and gay communities. On the contrary, many heterosexual representatives may
serve lesbian and gay communities more responsibly than lesbian or gay representatives.
15. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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vides a close look at the forces weighing on lesbian and gay districting
efforts. Lesbian and gay districting experiences in Texas and California further clarify districting issues. These examples demonstrate the
critical role community-based evidence has played in lesbian and gay
redistricting efforts. The representation attained by lesbian and gay
communities depends upon both the jurisdiction's contextual
homophobia and the community's own strength. Community-based
statistics are generally extrapolated from evidence of three primary
types: maps depicting lesbian and gay businesses and community
groups; maps depicting the membership of community religious, political, and social groups; and maps depicting voter support for lesbian,
gay, or supportive candidates.
Section Three of this article describes ways in which lesbian and
gay districting experiences may prove useful for blacks involved in
gaining greater representation in districting systems. In the wake of
the Miller decision, the use of the community-based statistics typically
employed in lesbian and gay districting efforts is a potentially effective
strategy for racial minorities attempting to achieve electoral
representation.
Districting is a deeply flawed representational system,16 and
scholars have argued that proportional representation would more effectively provide representation in a republican democracy.17 Indeed,
race-conscious districting has been necessary because the majority16. For a critique of districting and an argument for proportional representation to further
lesbian and gay interests, see Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian
and Gay Interests Through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.119 (1996).
Briefly, districting fails for many reasons. First, it requires a small group of people, dependent
on the maintenance of the status quo, to draw lines that determine representation. Second,
although districts have rigidly equal population numbers, the voting populace in each district
may vary enormously, giving voters in some districts more power in determining the elected
candidate. Third, the majority-rule aspect of a districting system represents minorities in an
especially inadequate fashion.
17. See Lani Guinier. No Two Seau: The Elusive Quert for Political E~uality,77 V A . L.
REV. 1413,1493-1513 (161) (arguing that a proportionaisyst~mwould compiy with the Voting
Rights Act's goals more effectively than districting); Mary A. Inman, C.P.R. (Change Through
Proportional Representation); Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U . PA. L. REV.
1991(1993) (arguing
. - - that a proportional system would revive political life in the United States,
and would more honestly reflect the goals-of voting rights jurisprudence). A proportional representation system in which voters elect representatives in jurisdiction-wide, non-majority rule
contests, easily surpasses districting in answering not just the representational needs of minorities, but also those of the entire population. Candidates are elected once they pass a threshold
that may be calculated approximately by dividing the vote by the number of legislative seats to
be filled. In a jurisdiction with 10 representatives, that threshold will be around lo%, permitting
some legislative voice for all organized. Liberating the legislatures from the choke hold of twoparty incumbency would give rise to an active, interested electorate, spurred on by the potential
for profound change in the political system.
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rule districting system isolates minority groups with memberships that
traverse districts. However effective proportional representation may
be, it has been misconstrued as election-by-quota. Although the electorate may turn to proportional representation out of frustration with
the current system, minority advocates cannot rely on this possibility
when districting, which has dominated the American political landscape since the early Republic, remains so ubiquitous. With the survival and empowerment of minority communities within the
democratic context as a fundamental goal, advocates for racial and
sexual minorities are forced to presume districting's continued predominance, lest they risk losing any voice, however faint, in the current representational system.
I. (UN)CONSCIOUS RACISM: THE REMOVAL OF RACECONSCIOUSNESS FROM THE DISTRICTING
EQUATION
A. The Supreme Court's Narrowing Interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act Has Weakened the Voting Potential of Racial
and Language Minorities
1. Black Electoral Empowerment Before Shaw and Miller

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, its 1982 Amendment, and its original interpretation by the Supreme Court prevent districting designed
to weaken the voting potential of a racial or language minority.18 The
Voting Rights Act was designed specifically to allow racial minori18. 42 U.S.C. 9 1973 (1988). The two-fold process employed to protect the voting rights of
minorities is set out in Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 provides a basis for
challenging all discriminatory election practices and procedures, focusing on the effects of the
challenged practice instead of requiring the challenger to establish that the intent in imposing
the requirement was to discriminate against a protected group. See 42 U.S.C. 1 1973(b). Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires pre-clearance by the Attorney General or U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia of any proposed districting plan for those jurisdictions designated under Section 4 as having previously attempted to erect barriers to prevent blacks from
participating in the political process (that is, literacy tests and similar devices). S. REP.NO. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182. See, e.g., United Jewish
Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (upholding a race-based New York apportionment scheme
challenged by the Hasidic minority in the jurisdiction).
Because multi-member districts have often been challenged as diluting minority votes, single-member districts are a preferred remedy. Senate Report Number 417 states:
In Fortson v. Dorsey. [379 U.S. 433 (-1965)l the Supreme Court held that the use of
multi-member districts was not unconstitutional per se, but warned: "It might well be
that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme,
under the circumstances of a particular case would operate to mrnimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."
S. REP.NO. 417,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982). reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 197.
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tieslg to elect representatives of their choice.20 Cities in the United
States, as well as the country as a whole, are becoming more racially
and ethnically diverse, and accordingly, the Voting Rights Act has a
weighty impact on the districting process. It appears to be common
practice to draw black and Latino districts before drawing other districts simply to comply with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act.21
Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act contain the most significant provisions for districting purposes. Section 2 permits racial and
language minorities to challenge districting plans that dilute their voting power by either effectively reducing the minority's voice in, or excluding it from, participation in the political .process.22 Section 5
provisions protect minority voting rights in specific jurisdictions by requiring that the jurisdiction's districting plans be granted preclearance
by the United States Department of Justice ("Justice Department")
before the plan is i~nplemented.~~
Although much of the voting rights
Litigation has focused on blacks and la ti no^:^ the legislative history of
the Voting Rights Actz5 and its interpretation in case law26establish
that other racial and language minorities are also intended to benefit
19. The Voting Rights Act was designed to remedy racial discrimination in voting rights. S.
REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182. To
pursue this goal, "based on an extensive record filled with examples of the barriers to registration and effective voting encountered by language-minority citizens in the electoral process,
Congress expanded the coverage of the Voting Rights Act to protect such citizens from effective
disenfranchisement." Id. at 186.
20. "Men and women from racial and ethnic minorities now hold public office in places
where that was once impossible." Id. at 181.
21. See Telephone Interview with Glen Maxey, State Representative from Austin. Texas
(Sept. 29,1995) (on file with author).
22. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 11973 (1988). For an analysis
of Section 2 enforcement, see Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendmenrs of Section 2 and
IN MINORITYVOTING:THE VOTINGRIGHTS ACT.
Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES
m PERSPECTIVE66 (Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
23. See Drew S. Days 111, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITYVOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS A c r IN PERSPEC~VE
52 (Bernard
Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
24. See Memorandum from Lani Guinier, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, to
Alan Gartner, Executive Director of the 1991 New York City Districting Commission, 12 (Aug.
20,1990) (hereinafter "Memorandum") (on file with author) ("African Americans and Hispanics are the two groups on whose behalf most contested cases are filed.").
25. See Additional Views of Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, S. REP. NO. 417.97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 94 (1982). reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,267 (criticizing the proportional effects of
the Amendment, stating: "That ultimately is what this so-called right to 'elect candidates of one's
choice' amounts to-the right to have established racially homogeneous districts to ensure proportional representation through the election of specific numbers of Black, Hispanic, Indian,
Aleutian and Asian-American officeholders.").
26. See, e.g., Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex., 849 F.2d 943,944 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (explaining that " '[l]anguage minority citizens' refers to those persons
who are Asian-American. American Indian. Asian natives, or of Spanish heritage").
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from the its provisions. Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act does
not require the creation of racial or language majority-minority dist r i c t ~ ?but
~ the Voting Rights Act is primarily about race?8 as districting practices demonstrate.
Regular enforcement of the Voting Rights Act through Section 2
and Section 5 interventions by the Justice Department has had a m e a ~
surable impact on racial minority representation in the electoral process. Before the Voting Rights Act was passed, there were five black
members of Congress. When the 1982 Amendment to the Voting
Rights Act was enacted, that number had nearly quadrupled. Since
the 1990 census-based redistricting, the number of blacks serving as
members of Congress has risen to nearly forty.29 This relatively rapid
rise in political representation for blacks marks one of the few undeniable improvements in the black political condition since the Civil
Rights M~vernent.~'The presence of blacks in our national and state
legislatures furthers the fundamental goal of the Voting Rights Act,
insuring that blacks have some opportunity to participate in the nation's democratic system.
2. Lesbians, Gays, and the Voting Rights Act
Lesbians and gays, as a group, have not benefitted from the Voting Rights Act because its provisions are primarily race-based and do
not address issues of gender, sexual orientation, or other potential
voting rights claims. Some lesbians and gays, as members of racial or
language minority groups, are protected under the Voting Rights Act.
As a class, however, lesbians and gays are not generally protected
under its provisions. Even if the language of the Voting Rights Act
were overtly changed to include lesbian and gay people as a class,
27. See John R. Dunne. Remarks: Redistricting in the 1990s: The New York Example. 14
CARDOZO
L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (1993).
28. But see Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said:
"When it comes to redistricting, race isn't everything, it's the only thing"?, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV.
1237,1275-76 (1993) (concluding that Vince Lombardi would have been wrong because the Voting Rights Act's emphasis on race relates to its race-blind ideal). Although race may not be the
only relevant consideration in the redistricting process, a racial-ethnic notion of minorities, one
exclusive of sexual or political minorities, does define the Voting Rights Act and its interpretation. See id.
29. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices, In 5-4 Vote, Reject Districts Drawn with Race as the
'Predominant Factor', N.Y. TIMES,June 30,1995, at Al.
30. A notable example of the regression in the living conditions of blacks is the large percentage of black men who are imprisoned. For an elaboration of this problem, see Steve Rickman, 200 Years of the Penitentiary: Criminal, Social and Economic Justice: The Impact of the
Prison System on the African Community, 34 How. L.J. 524 (1991).
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most of the theoretical districting constructs of the Voting Rights Act
still would not apply effectively to lesbian and gay people.31
Although provisions of the Voting Rights Act do not specifically
include lesbians and gays, the Voting Rights Act does affect their representational potential because people of color and people who are
lesbian or gay often share overlapping urban spaces. Inasmuch as
black and Latino districts are prioritized by the Voting Rights
lesbian and gay districts are, by definition, almost an afterthought.
Nonetheless, in certain jurisdictions lesbian and gay districts have
been created, principally on the basis of demonstrating the existence
of an identifiable lesbian and gay community. Given the Supreme
Court's movement toward disenfranchising racial minorities from voting rights, advocates of black representation might benefit from an
examination of the effectiveness of efforts by gay and lesbian advocates to gain representation for themselves in the political system.
B. Bogus Racial Blindness: Shaw, Miller and the Destruction of
Black Voting Rights
The principal tension in voting rights cases in the 1990s centers on
the role race should play in determining electoral districts and the ensuing representation. Shaw v. Reno33initiated a self-reflexive conversation within the Supreme Court about race and districting and, more
broadly, about race and democracy.34 In Shaw, the Court held that a
black-majority North Carolina district violated the constitutional
rights of the district's voters, who were forced to be part of a voting
district plainly designed to be a black majority district. As one scholar
commented, "[iln Shaw, the notion of color blindness was used to undermine an electoral plan designed to benefit a racial group that had
historically been deprived of their right to vote."3s Justice O'Connor
characterized the dilemma as one in which blacks had to suffer the
"stigma" of being part of a district designed by race-conscious legislators to provide representation for them.36 The Shaw decision also em31. 42 U.S.C. $5 1971-74. For a detailed critique of districting's inefficacy for lesbian and
gay voters, see Rosenblum, supra note 16.
32. S. REP.NO. 417. suura note 18.
33. Shaw v. Reno, i13 'S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
34. See Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV.
L. REV.
109-110 (1994) [hereinafter Guinier, "(E)raring Democracy"].
35. Chong-Soon Lee, supra note 10, at 779.
36. Shaw, 113 S.Ct at 2824. See id. at 2849 n.9 (1993) (Souter,J., dissenting) for an interestingly suggestive critique of the notion of "stigma."
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phasized the bizarre geographic shape of the voting district as a factor
in the Court's conclusion that the construction of the district violated
the Equal Protection Cla~se.~'
In the following Term, the Court decided two important district~ ~ Holder v.
In De
ing cases: Johnson v. De G r ~ n d yand
Grandy, Latino and black voters sued the state of Florida on a claim
of vote dilution. The plaintiffs argued that blacks and Latinos deserved higher numbers of majority-minority districts, that is, districts
in which the majority consists of members of a language or racial minority. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held that because the
state already had roughly proportional numbers of majority-minority
districts, it was not obliged to create another district in order to maximize minority repre~entation.~~
The Holder case involved a black community that was unable to
achieve adequate representation because the county government consisted of a single-person comrni~sion.~~
The Court held that because
the choice of the size of a particular governmental body is "inherently
standardless" due to the "wide range of possibilities" available to the
states in structuring governmental bodies, the size of a governmental
body could not be a consideration for the Court when determining the
validity of a Section 2 claim.42
Professor Lani Guinier has argued that both De Grandy and
Holder implicitly accept the role that race-consciousness plays in voting rights iss~es,4~
observing that "if Shaw v. Reno marks the voting
rights precipice, the Court blinked in its 1993 Ter~n."~"The 1995
Miller v. Johnson4sdecision, however, appears to fly headlong past the
Shaw precipice. Miller has transformed the law of districting, and will
continue to do so profoundly. In Miller, the Court reiterated that
under the standard established in Shaw, "a plaintiff states a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a state redistricting
plan, on its face, has no rational explanation save as an effort to sepa37. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Righrs: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.L. REV.
483,484 (1993).
38. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994).
39. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2541 (1994).
40. Johnson, 114 S. Ct, at 2663.
41. Holder. 114 S. Ct. at 2584.
42. Id. at 2588.
43. Guinier, (E)racing Democracy, supra note 34, at 117-18.
44. Id. at 117.
45. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct:2475 (1995).
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Following this brief explanation of
rate voters on the basis of
the Shaw holding, the Miller Court went on to institute a new legal
construct, labelled as a "Shaw claimn-one in which a white voter objects to a "racially gerrymandered" majority-minority district.
Georgia's 1990 census population, 27% of which was black, entitled the state to increase its congressional delegation from ten to
eleven seats in the 1990 reapportionment?' The Justice Department
twice rejected Georgia's redistricting plan, which provided for only
two majority black districts. In the second rejection of the state's redistricting plan, the Justice Department stated that the state had
"failed to explain adequately" why it had not created a third majorityminority
In response to the Justice Department's second rejection of its redistricting plan, Georgia added a third majority-minority district to its plan.49 When the new plan was implemented, Miller
and four other white residents of the newly created majority-minority
Eleventh District challenged its constitutionality. The Court held that
the white residents had successfully established a Shaw claim because
the third district created by Georgia's redistricting plan, created
predominantly to empower blacks, constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Unlike the district challenged in Shaw, the district Georgia created was quite regularly shaped;50however, the district included both
rural and urban black voters with only one commonality of interestrace. The Court considered this factor to be a key element in its finding that Georgia's effort to create a third majority-minority district
represented an unconstitutional use of race.
The Supreme Court, contrary to the beliefs of many who accept
that "race matters,"51 apparently has determined that race cannot
matter when voting districts are being drawn. As a result of the
Court's decision in Miller, blacks are now "protected" by the Voting
Rights Act in only the very limited sense that Justice Thomas asserted
in his Holder concurrence, leaving members of minority groups with-

Id. at 2482
Id. at 2483.
Id. at 2484.
Id.
The lack of significant irregularity is demonstrated by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.
See id at 2502-03.
WEST,RACEMATTERS (1993).
51. See, e.g., CORNEL
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Heinonline - - 3 9 Howard L.J. 1 5 8 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6

Overcoming Stigmas
out any guarantee that their vote will secure their meaningful
repre~entation.~~
A new era of voting rights litigation appears likely to follow
Shaw. Previously, voting rights litigation has focused on different
forms of voting discrimination, from restrictions on individuals, to districting, to anti-minority rule changes.53 Justice Stevens hints at this
new "mutant" generation of voting rights litigation, stating "[tlhe
Court attempts an explanation in these cases by equating the injury it
imagines respondents have suffered with the injuries African-Americans suffered under ~egregation."~~
In this fourth generation of voting
rights litigation, the goal, rather than to prevent new forms of antiminority behavior, would be to prevent "reverse discrimination"
against whites in majority black districts. The harm against whites
suggested by Shaw has taken full form as an equal protection claim
before the Court, opening the door for white residents in majorityminority districts to challenge successfully the constitutionality of the
district if race is the predominant factor in delineating the district
shape.55 If the lines of the district have been drawn predominantly on
the basis of race, white residents within the district would likely win an
equal protection challenge to the district, based on the constitutional
right to a "colorblind" district. District-drawing bodies across the
country will be forced to forego race as the predominant factor in
their redistricting plans, weakening black representation. In the
Miller decision, the Court completely abrogated any right blacks had
under the Voting Rights Act to coalesce as a group for political empowerment purposes.
Between the majority and dissenting voices of the Miller decision
lay Justice O'Connor's concurrence, a brief piece of willfully naive delusion. In her two-paragraph interpretation, OYConnorattempts to
52. See Guinier, (E)racing Democracy, supra note 34, at 118.
53. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (stating that districts must reflect, as nearly as
practicable, the "one person, one vote" standard); United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977) (upholding race-based New York apportionment scheme challenged by district's Hasidic
minority); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (holding that a change in districting to effect
the selection of state supreme court justices which was achieved by combining a majority-minority parish with three white majority parishes required pre-approval under provisions of the Voting Rights Act).
54. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct 2475, 2498 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Indeed, many such suits are already being filed. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Suits Challenging Redrawn Districts That Help Blacks, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 14, 1994, at A1 (discussing the
wave of suits challenging majority-minority districts since S h w v. Reno); Linda Greenhouse,
Court Questions Districts Drawn to Aid Minorities, N.Y. TIMES,June 29,1993, at A1 (describing
the possible effects of the Shaw v. Reno decision).
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limit the holding in Miller by asserting that it only bans racial gerrymandering in its extreme form.56 O'Connor attempts to limit Miller
by stating that it only applies to a small group of districts. In her
mind, "[alpplication of the Court's standard does not throw into doubt
the vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts, where
presumably the States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with
their customary districting principles. That is so even though race may
well have been considered in the redistricting process."57 Justice
O'Connor relies on the presumption that most state legislatures employ primarily nonracial considerations in drawing district lines. But
the very purpose of the Voting Rights Act is to make the process of
creating voter districts a race-conscious process directed toward providing racial and language minorities a political voice.58 Thus, most
states do take minority representation into account in drawing electoral district lines. Miller, therefore, is a far more powerful regressive
thrust than Justice O'Connor appears to be willing to acknowledge.
In an attempt to refute Justice Ginsburg's sharp criticism, Justice
O'Connor asserts that efforts on behalf of racial minorities to achieve
political representation certainly will not be treated "less favorably"
than "similar efforts on behalf of other
That, however, is
precisely the unfortunate inference to be drawn from Miller. The majority stated: "[Wlhere the State assumes from a group of voters' race
that they 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls,' it engages in racial stereotyping at
odds with equal protection mandates."60 Just as it is inaccurate to
generalize that members of a particular race share universal characteristics, it is equally inaccurate to presume that members of:a particular
race share no common characteristics. This point is at the core of Justice Ginsberg's dissent, which builds on the commonplace nature of
districting based on the strength of ethnic bonds and ethnic districts.61
Justice Ginsberg argues forcefully that the Court in Miller enforces a double standard against blacks: "If Chinese-Americans and
Russian-Americans may seek and secure group recognition in the delineation of voting districts, then African-Americans should not be
dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in the name of equal protection, we
56. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
57. Id.

58. See Guinier, (E)racing Democracy, supra note 34 at 134.
59. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497.
60. Id. at 2490.
61. Id. at 2504 (Ginsbug, J., dissenting).
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would shut out 'the very minority group whose history in the United
States gave birth to the Equal Protection C l a ~ s e ' . " ~ ~
C. Race and Ethnic Group-Conscious Districting after Miller

"I don't want to draw nigger districts"63
This subsection closely examines the Court's decision in Miller in
an attempt to define objectionable race-conscious districting. It then
briefly explores the implications of this definition on black communities and their representation in the political process.
1. Objectionable Race-Consciousness

The focus of the Miller majority centers on the distinction between rural and urban blacks. The Court constructed a narrative of
the Georgian reverse-racist district, suggesting the parameters of unacceptable race-conscious districting:
The Eleventh District lost the black population of Macon, but
picked up Savannah, thereby connecting the black neighborhoods
of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black populace of coastal
Chatham County, though 260 miles apart in distance and worlds
apart in culture. In short, the social, political and economic makeup
of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity not community.@

The Court here details the racial gerrymandering that was initially
cited by Justice O'Connor in the Shaw decision. Finding the basis for
its "tale of disparity" in the district court's characterization of the
Eleventh District, the Court states:
[tlhe populations of the Eleventh are centered around four discrete,
widely spaced urban centers that have absolutely nothing to do with
each other, and stretch the district hundreds of miles across rural
counties and narrow swamp corridors . . . .
Extending from Atlanta to the Atlantic, the Eleventh covered
6,784.2 square miles, splitting eight counties and five municipalities
along the way.65

The Court described in detail its objections to Georgia's Eleventh District: the district traversed political subdivisions, stretching from one
62. Id. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845).
63. Remark by Joe Mack Wilson, Georgia's 1981 Reapportionment Committee Chair.
Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1982). quoted in Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2502
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. Id at 2484.
65. Id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1389 (S.D.Ga. 1994)).
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part of the state to another; and, more fundamentally, the district's
residents were too diverse, living as they did in different regions of the
State, with different economies and, presumably, different electoral
interests. The Court found that the sole unifying factor among the
district's residents was their race.
Turning to a discussion of the role of community in the districting
process, the Court rationalized that the residents of Georgia's Eleventh District did not constitute a community merely because they
shared a commonality of race. According to Justice O'Connor, race
alone cannot be a substitute for proving community by "customary"
practice^."^ Thus, race may no longer itself constitute a political interest: "[ilt is true that redistricting in most cases will implicate a political
calculus in which various interests compete for recognition, but it does
not follow from this that individuals of the same race share a single
political interest."67 If race were still a political interest, the Miller
Court would not have rejected Georgia's efforts to create a third majority-minority district that merged urban and rural blacks. The
Court's flawed perspective is that constructing a voting district based
on the racial characteristics of its members is racial stereotyping, and
thus, violates of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's us'e of the construct of race-conscious districting,
however, belies the racism underlying its rulings. As Professor
Guinier argued shortly after Shaw was decided,
[Clritics of race-conscious districting have misdirected their fire.
Their emperor has no clothes. Their dissatisfaction with racialgroup representation ignores the essentially group nature of political participation. In this regard, the critics fail to confront directly
the group nature of representation itself, especially in a system of
geographic districting. Perhaps unwittingly, they also reveal a bias
toward the representation of a particular racial group rather than
their discomfort with group representation itself: In a society as
deeply cleaved by issues of racial identity as ours [is] . . . a system of
representation that fails to provide group representation loses
legitirna~y.~~

66. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2487.
68. Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Consciolcs Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX.
L. REV.1589,1591-92 (1993) (emphasis added). Professor Guinier's
commentary on this issue reveals the special prescience of her views in light of the Court's Miller
decision.
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The Court's insistence on viewing race-consciousness as an equal protection violation of whites demonstrates its bias against black representation. Professor Guinier's comments foreshadow Justice
Ginsburg's rationale in her Miller dissent, where she observes that
race, like ethnicity, is a highly prevalent form of identity, and thus
should not be ignored in districting consideration^.^^

2. The Challenges of Black Electoral Empowerment after
Miller
a. The Miller Community Standard
i. The Department of Justice and State Legislatures
The Justice Department's oversight role has been crucial to
achieving black electoral empowerment. Under the provisions of the
Voting Rights Act, the Justice Department oversees any state action
that has the potential to negatively impact minority voting rights as it
did in regards to Georgia's 1990 redistricting. The Miller Court rejected the Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act's redistricting provisions as necessitating the creation of a third
majority-minority district in Georgia. Consequently, according to the
Miller Court, Georgia's reliance on the Justice Department's guidance
regarding its redistricting efforts actually resulted in the state creating
a redistricting plan that was constitutionally invalid. Thus, the Miller
decision has sharply weakened the credibility of the Justice Department in its role as watch-dog over state voting rights actions.
Not content with merely chastising the state that obeying higher
governmental officials does not justify actions that result in equal protection violations, the Court clearly and unequivocally emphasized its
view that the Justice Department erred in forcing Georgia to create
the Eleventh District. In Miller, the Court stated: "In utilizing 5 5 to
require States to create majority-minority districts wherever possible,
the Department of Justice expanded its authority under the statute
beyond what Congress intended and we have upheld."70 The Court,
however, misreads its own record, notably its decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles,'l in rejecting this role of the Justice Department.
In subverting the Justice Department's authority, the Court invites state legislatures to favor minority vote dilution. Facing the
69. Miller, 115 S. Ct.at 2505.
70. Id.
71. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.30 (1986).
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threat of Shaw claims, state legislatures will undoubtedly confront
very different considerations in redistricting after the next census in
2000. With an increasingly diverse society, there will be more pressure on state legislatures to provide representation to growing numbers of minorities. But with the diminished role of the Justice
Department in the redistricting process as a result of the Miller decision, legislators who, like Joe Mack Wilson, do not want to create
"nigger districts"72 will have more opportunity to indulge their
prejudices during the next reapportionment and redistricting effort
following the 2000 census. As Justice Ginsberg points out:
The Court's disposition renders redistricting perilous work for state
legislatures. Statutory mandates and political realities may require
states to consider race when drawing district lines. But today's decision is a counterforce; it opens the way for federal litigation if
"traditional . . . districting principles" arguably were accorded less
weight than race?3
As Justice Ginsburg predicts in her dissent, wherever race is a consideration, parties may defeat a redistricting plan by arguing that race
considerations played a greater role in the development of the plan
than did traditional districting ~tandards.7~
According to Ginsburg, in
the war of minority representation, "[flederal judges in large numbers
may be drawn into the fray. This enlargement of the judicial role is
un~arranted."~
Indeed,
~
Justice Ginsburg's foresight proved accurate-unable to decide on a new plan for Georgia's eleven districts,
the Georgia State Legislature ceded line drawing power to a threejudge panel of the Eleventh C i r c ~ i t Ominously,
.~~
the Supreme Court
quickly approved the post-Miller Georgia plan, which cuts majority
black districts from three to one?7 The replication of this type of redistricting following the 2000 census would undoubtedly have disastrous consequences for black representation.

See Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494,501 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2507 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id.
High Court Backs New Districts in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1996, at A14. Kevin
Sack, Court Draws Georgia Map of Congressional Districts: 2 of 3 Black Majority Districts
Scrapped, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1995, at A22.
77. Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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ii. The Community Standard
In the face of the reactionary turn that voting rights law has
taken, black representation advocates will confront a far harsher
world in future redistricting struggles. A district court facing a Shaw
claim, for example, would probably be required to reject a districting
scheme based exclusively on census data that indicates that the black
population forms a particular pattern. Yet, as the Court disempowers
blacks, it also provides some sense of what it considers to be judicially
acceptable standards in establishing electoral districts. According to
the Court, the principal standard for justifying a majority-black or majority-minority district is whether the communities involved share
commonality of interests. As indicated above, the Court objected to
Georgia's Eleventh District because it did not reflect a notion of community. Thus, the Court has provided legislatures with a fairly concise
standard: "A State is free to recognize communities that have a particular racial makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of relevant interest^."'^ State legislatures will thus focus
on the notion of "community" and commonality of interests when
considering how to structure majority-minority districts. Although the
community standard clashes with antidilution goals, it matches traditional standards such as "compactness, contiguity and respect for
political subdivision^."^^
Justice Ginsburg's dissent clarifies the "community" standard.
The Court's move toward favoring ethnicity-based districting over
race-based districting indicates the basic philosophy the Court has
adopted regarding identity politics. Bound by a supposedly raceless
vision of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court refuses to permit
race to be the dominant factor in the districting process; yet the use of
ethnicity, for example, Russian or Filipino heritage, as the dominant
factor in the districting process would be acceptable. This dubious distinction invites the legal milieu to inquire what makes decisions based
on ethnicity more palatable for the Court's equal protection jurisprudence than decisions based on race. It would appear that ethnicity,
while generally inherited, is a characteristic that individuals can
choose to recognize or ignore. In districting, ethnicity would be manifested by where individuals choose to live: a Russian-American in
78. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
79. These three examples are cited by Justice Ginsburg in her Miller dissent. See id. at
2507.
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Brighton Beach could expect political representation of her ethnicity,
but were she to live elsewhere, her ethnicity might not have districting
implications. Evidence of ethnicity is thus not biological in nature, but
rather social, cultural, and political. Reading Miller in this context
leads to the conclusion that the Court would accept non-biological
markers of self-identity. The Miller "community standard" thus encourages blacks and Asians to represent their racial identity as akin to
ethnicity, emphasizing community and self-identification, those socalled "soft" statistical markers, while avoiding the exclusive use of
"hard statistical" markers like census data.
The new community standard doctrine involves a fundamental
shift for blacks. Application of the Equal Protection Clause since
Korematsus0 has centered on the immutability of race and, in particular, of blackness. Race's centrality in equal protection analysis is evidenced by the arrangement of analytical tiers around immutability. In
districting, data regarding immutable characteristics are translated
into census statistics that provide the raw numbers necessary to effect
a racial geography of the country.
For decades blacks have employed census data to advocate for
electoral districts of their own. The creation of black majority districts
has been at the heart of the federal government's effort to enfranchise
minorities through the Voting Rights Act. In the wake of Miller, however, blacks will be forced to advocate for representation by relying
on community traits that do not explicitly put race behind other factors. This requirement removes an aspect of black identity from the
districting equation-one that notably distinguished blacks from lesbians and gays. For districting purposes, blacks must move beyond the
relatively fixed biological identity of race toward a cultural, social, and
political definition of black identity.

80. Korematsu v. United States, 321 U.S.214 (1944) (upholding a wartime conviction for
violation of a military order excluding Americans of Japanese ancestry from certain designated
military areas on the West Coast).

[VOL. 39:149

166

Heinonline - - 3 9 Howard L.J. 1 6 6 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6

Overcoming Stigmas
b. Looking to Lesbian and Gay Representation as a
Model of Districting Advocacy
"[A] community is an idea as well as a group of people,"81

Like lesbians and gays, blacks are united by cultural, religious,
and political institutions that could serve as markers to identify black
communities for districting purposes. Lesbian and gay identity is beyond simple definition.82Although sexual orientation is considered by
many to be, like race, an immutable characteristic, individuals generally can and do control the public presentation of their sexual orientation. Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and other minorities cannot, for the
most part, avoid their racial and ethnic identities by modifying their
behavior. The ability of lesbians and gays to "pass" as heterosexuals
renders the demarcation of a lesbian and gay community a difficult
task.83 Another complicating factor is the continuum of sexuality.
While some individuals may behave like lesbians or gays, but not identify as such, others may identify as lesbians or gays. but not behave as
such. Fear of homophobia, which punishes those who are openly gay
or lesbian with ostracism, violence, and discrimination leads many lesbians and gays to deny or conceal their identity.
The lesbian and gay population cannot be identified on the basis
of census data or other official statistics. Even if completion of a census questionnaire required the respondent to reveal information about
81. Barbara A. Weightman, Commentary: Towards a Geography of the Gay Community, 1
J. CULTURAL
GEOGRAPHY
107 (1981). Weightman precedes this assertion with an analysis of
lesbian and gay communities:
In order to understand the nature of gay spaces, it is necessary to know something of
the central characteristics of the gay community. The at-large gay community is not a
community in the traditional sociological sense in that it lacks a broad definable
territorial base with primary institutions serving a residential population. However.
many smaller sub-communities do possess these characteristics. Id.
82. For an exploration of the lesbian, gay, and queer identity as it relates to the law, see
Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 83. For an analysis of the position of black lesbians and gays in the
black community, see generally Angela Gilmore, They're Jusr Funny That Way: Lesbians, Gay
Men and African-American Communities as Viewed Through the Privacy Prism, 38 How. L.J.
231 (1994). For an example of the complexity of the intersection of racial and sexual identities,
see BELL HOOKS, IS Paris Burning?, in BLACKLOOKS:RACEAND REPRESENTATION
145 (1993)
(criticizing the film "Paris Is Burning," which depicts a black gay subculture).
83. Race is not by any means a clear-cut identity either, given the fallacy of distinct biological races. However, the rule established seems to depend on appearance: if one appears to be
black, one is black. Thus, black people who appear white can "pass" as white. Whereas passing,
for blacks, is available to a relatively small number of people, many lesbian and gay people can
pass as straight. And those who cannot pass as straight fail to do so primarily because of the
public's confusion of gender and sexual identity, not because they are biologically required to be
open. Given the ability of lesbians and gays to pass as straights, one can see how difficult an
exercise it would be to count the lesbian and gay population, especially across culture.
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one's sexual identity, the results of the census would be suspect.84
Thus, "hard" population numbers used for districting purposes do not
exist for lesbians and gays. Even general estimates of the percentage
of the population that is lesbian or gay vary greatly.
This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that even though many
lesbian and gay people do live in identifiable urban ghetto^,"^^ a substantial number of lesbians and gays, either by choice or because of
economic necessity, live in neighborhoods identified by the class, race,
or ethnicity of the population rather than the population's sexual orientation. This lack of incontrovertible, objective group boundaries
plagues lesbian and gay districting activism.
For state and statistical purposes, membership in the class
"black," of whatever socioeconomic background, political, or ideological affiliation, is a fairly straightforward matter. The statistical inquiry centers predominately on the question, "Do you have black
ancestry?" and only negligibly deals with the thorny complex of selfidentification. Gay and lesbian community membership, on the other
hand, a maddeningly subjective phenomenon based principally upon
self-identification, is not easily reduced to the clear-cut logic required
for State and statistical purposes. Furthermore, because the national
census does not gather information on sexual orientation, advocates
attempting to demarcate lesbian and gay communities must rely on
"soft" community statistics. These "soft" statistics lack the "hard" authority of official census data relied upon in racial minority districting.
Whereas census counts, voter registration, and even surnames
may serve to delineate discrete minority populations, lesbian and gay
population estimates, based on donor records and the number of lesbian- and gay-owned businesses and institutions, lack official imprirnatur. The lesbian and gay community's ingenious strategy for
overcoming the lack of hard data may be precisely the tool needed by
advocates of black representation in the post-Miller era.86
84. Although same sex households, which the census does quantify, might indicate the presence of a lesbian and gay population, such statistics also would include fraternities, sororities,
and the many heterosexual men and women who live together.
85. Many refer to lesbian and gay urban communities as "ghettos." For an example of this
A CROSS-CULTURAL
use of the tern, see MANUELCASTELLS,THECITYAND THE GRASSROOTS:
167 (1983) (stating: "For straight San Franciscans, the
THEORYOF URBANSOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Castro ghetto . . . . seemed to be from another world . . . .").
86. Although lesbian and gay districting schemes have not faced the challenges in the federal courts that black representational schemes have had to face, it would appear that the methods lesbian and gay groups have employed to establish their right to representation as a group
may fit well into the Miller standard.
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11. ATTAINING MAJORITY SEXUAL MINORITY
DISTRICTS THROUGH COMMUNITY EVIDENCE
Several lesbian and gay communities have successfully utilized
community-based evidence to support the creation of majority lesbian and gay districts. Three different scenarios theorize possibilities
The 1991 New
for representation of lesbian and gay comm~nities.8~
~ o r kCity Council Redistricting reveals most clearly the extent to
which alternative methods fit into contemporary districting practice.
Texas and California redistricting examples confirm the widespread
use of such methods and elaborate upon the successes and failures of
districting advocacy efforts. This section will conclude with a summary of community-based standards employed by activists in establishing lesbian and gay districts.
A. Three Scenarios for Lesbian and Gay Districts
Under the Court's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act before
Miller, lesbian and gay representation may exist under limited circumstances in urban areas when the location of the lesbian and gay community fits within the scope of a minority-based districting scheme.
Like other minorities, lesbians and gay men face a wide range of representational prospects, from majority districts to fractured communities. The first two scenarios for lesbian and gay representation under
the Voting Rights Act center around a whole lesbian and gay community in a district, while the third involves a district that splits a lesbian
and gay community geographically. Where the lesbian and gay community is significant enough to constitute the majority in a singlemember district, the first scenario would involve the creation of a majority-lesbian and gay district. This scenario could occur in either a
predominantly white district where several adjacent majority-minority
districts leave a concentrated white lesbian and/or gay community, or
in a majority-minority district where racial and ethnic minorities constitute the majority population of a district. Another form of this scenario would be a single-member district with a majority of lesbians
and gays of color, as part of a majority-minority district-a possibility
in cities with large racial and sexual minority populations such as New
York and Los Angeles. Well-known lesbian and gay communities,
87. I use the word "communities" here because a fair number of lesbian and gay representatives have been elected to office in districts which do not have a significant concentration of
lesbian and gay population.
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however, are generally located within white neighborhoods, making
this scenario the less likely possibility.
A lesbian and gay community too small to form a single-member
district might fall completely within the boundaries of a larger district.
In this second scenario, a lesbian and gay influence district could exist
in a white, multicultural, or majority-minority
In a district
such as this, electoral candidates are likely to be sensitive to issues of
concern to the lesbian and gay community because its voters can sway
election outcomes. Although not a voting majority, the strength of
the lesbian and gay influence could result in a successful bid for office
by a lesbian or gay candidatesg whose position on issues appeals to
both the homosexual and heterosexual communities. The same scenario could occur where a lesbian and gay community would be an influential part of a majority-minority or multicultural district. A lesbian
and gay influence is only possible when the voting majority in the district is not hostile toward lesbian and gay issues. In a district in which
anti-lesbian and anti-gay sentiment divides the population, efforts to
promote lesbian and gay interests will likely fail-even when fortynine percent of the district is lesbian or gay. Despite the size of its
population, a lesbian and gay community in such a jurisdiction could
consistently be outvoted by the conservative voters in the district, effectively depriving members of the lesbian and gay community of
their political voice.
Lesbian and gay majority or influence districts assure that some
degree of lesbian and gay representation will exist in the jurisdiction's
legislature. In this third scenario, when a lesbian and gay community
is fractured between or among districts, any potential lesbian and gay
electoral voice is silenced. The primacy of constitutional and statutory
mandates, as well as districting conventions over lesbian and gay representation, renders fracturing a common result in districting. In this
situation, a lesbian and gay community that might be large enough to
88. A notable example of this fracturing and its consequences occurred in the Brooklyn,
New York, districting plan challenged in United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), in
which the Williamsburgh Hasidic Community of 60,000 people was split into two districts. For
further discussion of this case, see Guinier, supra note 17, at 1454.
89. Many lesbian and gay candidates and politicians are community activists rather than
party activists. For example, Thomas K. Duane was a housing activist and member of ACT-UP
(The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power). Interview with Thomas K. Duane, City
Councilmember, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 31,1993). Karen Burstein, the openly lesbian candidate for New York State Attorney General in 1994, was not endorsed by the Democratic Party's
convention. See Todd S. Purdum, Democrars Pick New York Slate of Incumbents, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1994, at Al.
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qualify as a majority in a district but that lacks the power necessary to
sway those involved in the districting process, would be split into inconsequentially small groups.
B. Representing Lesbians and Gays in the New York City Council
New York City, the largest city in the country, is filled with innumerable racial, ethnic, and other interest groups, and exemplifies the
difficulties lesbians and gays encounter in their attempts to gain group
representation in the political system. For the first time, in 1991, however, the New York City Districting Commission ("Commission") created one lesbian and gay "winnable" district, Manhattan's District 3.90
However, efforts to create a proposed second district in Brooklyn
failed. Manhattan's District 3 has been described as a district "which
has been drawn to be winnable by a gay or lesbian and id ate."^'
Strong evidence of the existence of a lesbian and gay community in
Manhattan convinced the Commission to provide for representation
of that particular community in the districting process. The comparative weakness of the evidence of a Brooklyn lesbian and gay cornmunity undoubtedly contributed to the Districting Commission's failure
to create a lesbian and gay district in Brooklyn.

90. Other scholarship has examined the New York City Council redistricting in depth. See
generally Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Boundaries and Bullwinkles: The Limitations of SingleURB.L.J. 759 (1993); Frank J. MacchiaMember Districts in a Multiracial Context, 19 FORDHAM
rola & Joseph G . Diaz, The 1990 New York City Districting Commission: Renewed Opportunity
for Participation in Local Government or Race-Based Gerrymandering? 14 CARDOZOL. REV.
1175 (1993). See also, Alan Gartner, Introduction, 14 CARDOZOL. REV. 1119 (1993); Donne,
supra note 27; Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interesw The Question of SingleMember Districts, 14 CARDOZOL. REV. 1135 (1993); Grofman. supra note 28.
91. Frank Lombardi, Scrambling for [a] Piece of New Council Pie, N.Y. DAILYNEWS,June
5, 1991, at 33.
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1. The Establishment of New York's Lesbian and Gay
Constituency
In New York, the lesbian and gay c o n ~ t i t u e n c y ,centered
~~
in
West Village and Chelsea," grew out of a series of primary votes and
the election of New York's first openly lesbian state assemblyperson.
Until 1991, when the Districting Commission's recommendations
were implemented, Carol Greitzer, a heterosexual woman, represented the district which included the West Village and Chelsea lesbian and gay neighborhood^.^^ Gay candidates in New York City
primary elections had relatively little success in their attempts to run
for public office95 until 1985, when David Rothenberg came close to
winning the primary for this district.96
In 1989, benefiting from his broad reputation as a community activist, Tom Duane came even closer to winning the Democratic pri92. "Constituency" indicates "[tlhe inhabitants of an electoral district." BLACK'SLAWDIC311 (6th ed. 1990). More brcadly, "constituency" indicates a community whose members are constituents, "being those whom [a legislator] represents and whose interests he is to
care for in public affairs." Id. Thus, a lesbian and gay constituency is a community whose interests are electorally represented. However, my purpose in supporting a proportional representation system is, in part. to support the enfranchisement of minorities that might not be considered
constituencies under a districting system.
Because it would be beyond the scope of this paper to outline the establishment of a lesbian
and gay community in New York, I only discuss the establishment of a lesbian and gay constituency, narrowly construed, as a group of people who elect a representative. For an especially rich
GAYNEWYORK(1994).
source of New York lesbian and gay history, see GEORGECHAUNCEY,
93. m e West Village and Chelsea neighborhoods cover approximately the area from Houston Street to 30th Street, following the south and north boundaries, and from 5th Avenue to the
Hudson River, following the east and west boundaries. Brooklyn's Park Slope also is home to a
strong lesbian and gay community. Park Slope's lack of lesbian and gay representation, however, renders its status as a constituency far more difficult to define.
94. See, e.g., Lombardi, supra note 91 ("Greitzer didn't want to run in her old district,
which has been drawn to be winnable by a gay or lesbian candidate."); see also Interview with
Robert Bailey, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 30. 1993) (on file with the author) (discussing how
Greitzer's incumbency prevented a gay candidate from winning the seat in 1985 and 1989, and
her attempts to influence the districting process); Duane, supra note 89 (discussing the insignificance of the role Greitzer played in the 1991 campaign).
95. See Jessie Mangaliman, Manhattan Closeup; Tough Challenge in a Loyal District, N.Y.
NEWSDAY,Aug. 25,1989, at 23 (discussing the 1973 candidacy of Jim Owles and the 1985 candidacy of David Rothenberg as the precursors to Thomas K. Duane's 1989 council primary race);
Bailey, supra note 94.
96. Rothenberg garnered 44% of the primary vote in 1985. See Voting Totals in Ciry Primary, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 12, 1985, at B6. See also Jeffrey Schmalz, Liberals Split as Homosexual
Seeks Council Seat in Manhanun, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 5, 1985, at B3 (describing the conflict for
liberals in choosing between Carol Greitzer, an established progressive incumbent, and David
Rothenberg, the openly gay, progressive challenger). Notably, in the following year, the political
organizations that backed Rothenberg mobilized to pass the City's first lesbian and gay rights
law. See Bailey, supra note 94.
TIONARY
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mar^.^'

Duane lost the primary election because the larger district,
which was under the old City Council system, included areas where
comparatively few lesbian and gay people lived.gg In 1990, Deborah
Glick became the first openly lesbian or gay elected official in New
York State by winning the Greenwich Village seat in the New York
State A ~ s e r n b l y . ~ ~
Many othkr lesbian and gay communities exist throughout New
York City, most notably in Jackson Heights, Queens,loOand in Park
Slope, Brooklyn, and adjacent areas. Although lacking the West Village-Chelsea community's prominence, these communities serve as
centers of lesbian and gay populations in their respective boroughs.
2. The Districting Commission's Origin and Purpose Focused on
Minority Empowerment
New York City stands on the precipice ofa golden era.
For the first time we have the possibility of having a
Council that is representative of all New Yorklo'
Board of Estimate v. Morris,lo2 in which the United States
Supreme Court declared New York City's government unconstitutional, precipitated New York City's 1991 redistricting. Prior to this
decision, the Board of Estimate, composed of three city-wide elected
officials and the presidents of the five boroughs of New York City,
performed many of the administrative and legislative functions of the
city government.lo3 Each of the five borough presidents had an equal
vote on matters before the Board, without regard to the size of the
97. Duane won 45% of the primary vote in 1989. See Results in Tuesday's Primary Elections, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 14, 1989, at B2.
98. Neighborhoods other than Chelsea and West Village, such as Gramercy Park, are not
home to large lesbian and gay populations. See Submission of Empire State Pride Agenda to
the Districting Commission (Mar. 27, 1991) (on file with author).
99. Interview with Richard Dadey, Executive Director of Empire State Pride Agenda
(ESPA), in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 6, 1994) (on file with author). See Kevin Sack, First Openly
Gay Legislator Brings Full Agenda to Albany. N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 13, 1991, 1 1, at 23.
100. See Norimitsu Onishi, In a Gay Haven, a Sense of Community Builds, N.Y. TIMES,Dec.
4, 1994, 8 13, at 9.
Jackson Heights has been a y mecca since the 1920's when the quick subway ride to
Times S uare drew vaudevilks here. And in recent years, as immigrants have transformed %e neighborhood, the area has turned into New York City's epicenter for gay
Hispanic eople. It is a counterpoint to the Village or Chelsea, where the gay population of w i t e , middle-class men share common histories.
Id
101. Frank Lombardi, 'A New Day' for Minorities, T H EDAILYNEWS,June 4, 1991, at 11
(quoting Esmeralda Simmons, member of the Districting Commission).
102. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
103. Id. See also CHARTEROF THE CITYOF NEWYORK8 61 (1986) [hereinafter CHARTER].
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borough's population. Thus, although Brooklyn's population was
more than six times greater than the population of Staten Island, a
vote by the borough president of Staten Island was equal to the vote
of Brooklyn's borough president. The Court held that this system violated the one-person, one-vote rule enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims.lo4
In response to the Court's decision, New York City appointed the
Charter Revision Commission to investigate alternative forms of governmental bodies that could be adopted to replace the City's Board of
Estimate. The Charter Revision Commission heard presentations on
various alternatives ranging from simply replacing the offending
"equal vote" with a "weighted vote'' and leaving the current system
intact,lo5 to bicameral legislatures,lo6 to proportional representation.lo7Ultimately, the Commission supported an increase in the size
and power of the City Council.1os This increase was pre-cleared by
the Justice Department in a letter stating: "minority voters will likely
have an increased opportunity to elect members of the enlarged and
more powerful city council."109
Indeed, promoting minority empowerment by providing minorities with an opportunity to increase their representation on the City
Council was the fundamental purpose of the Districting Commission.
Decades of Justice Department challenges had exposed New York's
weak record in districting for minority representation.l1° In a historical context, minority groups capitalized on the unique opportunities
104. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Among the cases cited in Morris are Reynolds'
"companion cases and progeny:" Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182,185 (1971) (holding that local
governments are permitted greater population disparities among districts than higher levels of
government); Hadley v. Junior College Dist. of Metro. Kansas, 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) ("[Tlhe
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must
be given an equal opportunity to participate in [popular] election[s], and . . . each district . . .
must. . . insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally
equal numbers of officials."); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479-81 (1968) (holding
that Reynolds applied to local governments).
105. See Interview with Judith Reed, General Counsel for the 1991 New York City Districting Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 27, 1993) (on file with author).
106. See Reed, supra note 90, at 764.
107. See Reed, supra note 105; Bailey, supra note 94.
108. SUBMISSION
UNDERS E C ~ O 5NOF nn V o m c RIGHTSACT FOR PRECLEARANCE
OF
PROPOSEDAMENDMENTS
TO THE NEWYORKCITY CHARTER12-15 (Aug. 11,1989) [hereinafter
(on file' at the New York Municipal Library, 55 Chambers St., New York, NY
SUBMISSION]
10007).
THE LINES: REDISTRIC~NG
AND THE POU109. Id. at 4; see also ALANGARTNER,DRAWING
ncs OF RACIALSUCCESSION
IN NEW YORK(1993) (noting that "[tlhe simplest way to describe
this new power is to note that the Council was granted the authority to approve the city's $27
billion budget").
110. See Reed, supra note 105. See also GARTNER,supra note 109, at 55-56 11.72.
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presented by the revision of districts to further minority empowerment. According to Judith Reed, General Counsel for the Districting
Commission, "[tlhe work of the Commission was favorably affected
by the presence of so many members of racial and language minority
groups protected by the Voting Rights Act."lll The results of the
1990 census reinforced the wisdom of the Commission's emphasis on
minority representation. According to the census data, New York
City had become a majority-minority city, with 56.3% of its population composed of blacks, Latinos, and Asian Arnerican~.~'~
The Charter Revision Commission ranked the standards to be
used in districting the city, an action apparently unique to New York
City.l13 Following the Reynolds "one person, one vote" standard, the
first criterion required by electoral districts is that they be roughly
equal in population size.l14 The second criterion, modeled on the Voting Rights Act of 1965, was to "ensure the fair and effective representation of the racial and language minority groups in New York City
which are prote~ted.""~The Commission, acting before the Miller
decision, held firm to its credo-"[Wlhere a minority district could be
created, it must be created. ' 9 1 1 6
3. District Lines Reflected the Goal of Minority Empowerment
The Commission's work was conducted in as open a manner as
possible considering the political nature of the group's task. It held
public hearings in all neighborhoods of the City, provided public access to a computer that housed files containing the districting program
111. Aff. of Judith Reed at 4, Ravitch v. City of New York, No. 90-5752 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(arguing that had the census results been released at the time the Commission was formed, there
likely would have been one more Latino appointed to the Commission to reflect the nearly equal
balance of the Black and Latino populations). "The Commission . . consisted of four African
Americans, three Latinos, one Asian-American, and seven whites." Id. at 1. In order to ensure
that its actions were in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, the Commission engaged Judith
Reed, attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. as General Counsel. Reed, supra note
105.
supra note 108 at 6. New York City's majority-minority population
112. See SUBMISSION,
consists of African Americans (25.2%). Latinos (24.4%), and Asian Americans (6.7%), collectively comprising 56.3% of the City's total population. The voting-age population of people of
color is, however, predictably smallec 23.4% African American. 22% Latino. 6.7% Asian. totaling 52% of the voting-age population. Id.
113. See GARTNER,
supra note 109, at 23 n.26.
114. See CHARTER,
supra note 103, at 5 52(l)(a) (as amended Dec. 31, 1989) (stating that
the one-person, one-vote standard required that "the difference in population between the least
populous and the most populous districts shall not exceed ten percentum of the average population for all districts.").
115. Id. 5 52(l)(b).
116. Reed, supra note 90, at 763.

.
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the Commission was using,"' and reviewed over thirty alternate districting plans submitted by community groups and other concerned
parties.'18 The Commission began to create districts by first focusing
on areas in which racial and language minorities were concentrated.
Once districts were drawn around these areas, white districts were created to fill in the remainder of the map."%lthough,
according to the
new census data, black and Latino populations were roughly equal in
size, the dispersed Latino population made creating Latino districts
more challenging.'*O This enabled the Commission to create more
majority-black districts than it might otherwise have been able to
d0.l2'
Asian Americans, who comprised slightly more than seven per~ ~ not adequately represented in
cent of the City's p o p ~ l a t i o n , 'were
the redistricting process because of the low number of Asian Americans who responded to census data requests, low Asian-American
voter regi~tration,'~~
and language barriers.'24 Even though the citywide Asian-American population was sufficient to require the Commission to establish several Asian-American seats on the City
Council, the dispersion of the Asian Americans. like that of Latinos,
diluted their electoral strength.'25
The most challenging issue faced by the Commission was to resolve competing claims between blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans.lZ6 In some instances, inter-minority disagreements impacted on
117. See GARTNER.
supra note 109. at 135.
118. See A& of Judith Reed, supra note 111, at exhibit 23.
119. See Reed, supra note 105.
supra note 108, at Appendix I (Report of 1990 Census Population Dic
120. See SUBMISSION,
tributions and Densities (stating that 69% of the City's African Americans live in Voter Tabulation Districts (VTD), the smallest geographic area used in districting, and comprise at least 50%
of the total VTD population, while only 48% of Hispanics reside in WDs)).
121. Id.
122. Felicia R. Lee, Blocs Battle to Draw Chinatown's New Council Map, N.Y. TIMES,Apr.
30, 1991, at B1, B4 [hereinafter Blocs Battle].
123. See Reed, supra note 90, at 774; Bailey, supra note 94; see also Su Sun Bai, Comment,
Afirrnative Pursuit of Political Equaliry for Asian Pacific Americans: Reclaiming the Voting
Rights Act, 139 U . PA. L. REV. 731. 736-38 (1991) (arguing that low voter registration afflicts
Asian Pacific Americans generally).
124. See Reed, supra note 90, at 762-63.
125. This estimate is premised on groups' achieving representation on the Council proportionate to the percentage of the City's population which they represent. ?hus, because each of
the 51 City Council seats represent just under two percent of the City's population, Asian
Americans, who comprise slightly more than seven percent of the City's population, would be
entitled to just over three seats on the Council by a proportional calculation.
126. Seegenerally Reed, supra note 105 (describing the inter-minority conflict that characterized decisions over some districts).
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the representation of the five principal lesbian and gay neighborhoods, namely, Lower Manhattan, Park Slope, Boerum Hill, Brooklyn
Heights, and Jackson Heights.
4. Representant Z'Autre: Lesbians and Gays Attaining
Representation Through Community Evidence

a. The "Other" Minority
The Charter's third criterion for establishing an electoral district
provided that "[dlistrict lines shall keep intact neighborhoods and
communities with established ties of common interest and association,
whether historical, racial, economic, ethnic, religious or other."lZ7 It
was this clause that made representation in the political process possible for lesbian and gay communities. The word "other," intended to
include sexual preference,lZ8 was a discreet, euphemistic reference
that gave lesbian and gay representation precedence over traditional,
but not constitutionally mandated, considerations such as compactnesslZ9and respect for neighborhood or borough b o ~ n d a r i e s . ' ~ ~
b. Community Evidence Fostered the District's Creation
Lesbian and gay activists, most notably the Empire State Pride
Agenda ("ESPA"), which is the only state-wide lesbian and gay political organization, were among the most vocal groups lobbying for
127. See CHARTER,supra note 103, at §52(l)(c).

128. See, e.g., Hernandez, Gays Launch Drive for Council, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Apr. 7,1991, at 7.
Both Robert Bailey and Alan Gartner confirmed that this was the intent of the drafters in selecting the catch-all phrase "or other." See Bailey, supra note 94; GARTNER,
supra note 109, at 167.
The cloaking of lesbians and gays as "other[s]" is richly descriptive of the role the Districting
Commission assigned to lesbian and gay people.
129. A district is compact when its borders are as close as possible to a central point, so that
the shape is easily identifiable. Gerrymandering is often viewed as the opposite of compactness
because gerrymandered districts often have bizarre shapes. The court in Dillard v. Baldwin
County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988) explored the reasons for the emphasis
on compactness:
The court therefore believes, especially in light, of 5 2's strong national mandate, that a
dlstrict is sufficiently geograph~callycom act I£ tt allows for effective representatton.
For example, a district would not be sufRciently compact if it was so spread out that
there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative could
not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each other; or if it was so convoluted
that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative
could not easily tell who actuallg lived within the district. Also of importance, of
course, is the compactness of neig bonng d~strrcts;obviously, it, because of the configuration of a district, its neighboring distncts so lacked compactness that they could not
be effectively represented, the Thornburg standard of compactness would not be met.
Id. at 1466.
130. CHARTER,supra note 103, at 8 52(l)(d)-(g).
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their own district before the C o r n m i ~ s i o n .Their
~ ~ ~ principal form of
activism involved concerted preparation and presentation of evidence
to support the claim that creation of a lesbian and gay district in Manhattan was warranted. According to Richard Dadey, Executive Director of ESPA, "[ilt could be best described as an insiders [sic] game,
there were no protests, there weren't mass letter campaigns, there
weren't hordes of lesbians and gays attending public hearings."132 As
Alan Gartner, Executive Director of the Commission, stated: "[the
Commissioners] were overwhelmed by the sophistication and subtlety
of the Manhattan lesbian and gay pre~entation."'~~
ESPA presented
statistics, drafted a district map, and organized concerted testimony
before the Commission, prompting Gartner to note:
They [gay and lesbian community activists] had two cases to make:
first, that gays and lesbians were a community, similar if not identical to the racial and language minority groups protected by the Voting Rights Act, that suffered from discrimination and were entitled
to representation; and, second, that there were areas of the city in
which sufficient concentrations of lesbians and gays (and their supporters) lived so as to form the basis of a district. [ESPA] marshaled extensive testimony on both t 0 p i ~ s . l ~ ~
To demonstrate the discrimination faced by lesbians and gays, advocates pointed to rising violence and discrimination directed against
members of the lesbian and gay community.13s Unlike blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans, however, lesbian and gay people were
not identified as a group by "hard" census data.136 Although some
demographers of the lesbian and gay community contend that
households headed by same-sex partners reveal a lesbian and gay pop-

131. See Frank Lynn, Seeking More Minority Council Members, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 24,1991, at
32 (quoting Alan Gartner: "Asian-Americans, Dominicans, and gay groups have been the most
vocal advocates of Council representation.").
132. Dadey, supra note 99.
133. Interview with Alan Gartner, Executive Director of the 1991 New York City Districting
Commission, in New York, N.Y.(Jan. 6, 1994).
134. GARTNER,supra note 109, at 133.
135. Id.
136. Although race is identified by the census, undercounting and non-identification led the
Commission to use a computer program that identified names of Spanish and Asian origin. The
use of this program provided the Commission with much of its information regarding these
populations. See Peter Morrison, Using the Surname Method to Gauge Hispanic and Asian
Voting Strength in Proposed Council Districts, SUBMISSION,
supra note 108, Exhibits Book 1,
Exhibit 12.
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ulation,13' supporting census data were not available to the community activists or to the C o m ~ n i s s i o n . ~ ~ ~
c. Mapping the Lesbian and Gay Community
Lacking "hard" statistics on the lesbian and gay population, activists had to rely on "soft," but ingenious statistics to locate lesbian and
gay communities. ESPA presented a wide range of "soft" statistics
about the lesbian and gay community of Chelsea-West Village extrapolated from data based on election returns, community institutions,
and organizational mailing lists. According to Robert Bailey, "[aln
overlay of primaries and elections with various mailing lists from businesses to political groups to nightclub lists was used. When they combined lists, it was obvious where the district was."139
i. Election Returns
The returns from three previous elections in which openly gay
candidates had participated formed the principal evidence justifying
the creation of a West Village-Chelsea district.140 Combined maps of
voting patterns for lesbian and gay candidates in past primaries and
elections demonstrated the existence of an identifiable population of
supporters for lesbian and gay candidates.141 Admittedly, the credibility of voting patterns as evidence of the existence of lesbian and gay
communities is tempered by the possibility of heterosexuals voting for
lesbian and gay candidates. Moreover, the generally low turnout for
local election contests can undermine this relatively "hard" statistical
basis for lesbian and gay districting maps. Despite these inherent
weaknesses, this evidence was the best that the lesbian and gay districting advocates could marshal and, apparently, the evidence persuaded the Commission.
ii. Lesbian and Gay Institutions
Other maps indirectly suggested the density of the lesbian and
gay population through the locations of lesbian and gay institutions.
Visible signs of the lesbian and gay community, such as book stores,
137. See Bailey, supra note 94 (stating that Roderick Dial, consultant to the Commission,
explored this possibility).
138. See Reed, supra note 90.
139. Bailey, supra note 94.
140. Lynn, supra note 131.
141. See GARTNER,
supra note 109, at 133.

Heinonline - - 3 9 Howard L.J. 1 7 9 1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6

Howard Law Journal

bars, and community and religious groups, suggested where the district lines should be drawn.142 According to Richard Dadey, "The
number of organizations serving the gay and lesbian community is
also extremely high in the neighborhoods of Chelsea and the West
Village . . . . Existing in the heart of the West Village is the Gay and
Lesbian Community Center-a center of activity and connection for
some 300 lesbian and gay
ESPA drew a geographically
compact map around this concentration of lesbian and gay institutions
in predominantly white West Village and Chelsea. It should be noted
that many lesbians and gays of color utilize these institutions but live
e l ~ e w h e r e , 'and
~ ~ therefore, forfeit the representation that might result from living within this lesbian and gay community.
iii. Organizational Mailing Lists
An analysis of a mailing list containing the names of 34,000 contributors to lesbian and gay organizations, organized by zip code, suggested that the concentration of lesbian and gay donors was five times
higher in Chelsea and the West Village than in the rest of Manhattan.145While this information served as supporting evidence in efforts
to establish the presence of a lesbian and gay community in Manhattan, it was used as the primary evidence by activists attempting to gain
a lesbian and gay district in Brooklyn, where activists lacked access to
the kind of electoral records data which had been made available to
Manhattan activists.

5. The Districting Process
The Commission responded favorably to the suggestion that it
should create a lesbian and gay electoral district. Initially, however,
the Commission did not follow ESPA's plan, which proposed that
Houston Street be used as the southern boundary for the district,
keeping the West Village and Chelsea lesbian and gay communities
intact within one district. During the Commission's proceedings,
142. Id.
143. Richard Dadey, Testimony before the Districting Commission (Mar. 27. 1991) (on file
with author).
144. For a discussion of the historic significance of Christopher Street for the lesbian and gay
community, see Randy Kennedy, Christopher Street: Changes Sweep the Gay Mecca, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1994, 1 16, at 6 ("Since the mid-19701s,[Christopher] Street has been known virtually
worldwide as the mecca of gay life in New York City and, indeed, in the United States, rivaled
only by Polk Street in San Francisco.").
145. Dadey, supra note 143 (presenting data gathered by the media group Strub-Dawson).
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Christopher Street, which is located in the heart of West Village, was
designated as the southern boundary of District 3.146 The area south
of Christopher Street, extending to Houston Street, was initially designated for inclusion in an Asian-American district centered in Chinatown. John Magisano, President of Gay and Lesbian Independent
Democrats, said, "We want the southern boundary at Houston. Margaret [Chinl's people want to go north of that. Zip code area 10014 is
one of the gayest neighborhoods in New York. We're not willing at
this point to give up that area."147 One newspaper reported that
"Greenwich Village homosexuals contend that [the preliminary plan
adopted] would take some constitdents they need for a gay distri~t."'~
The
~ district proposed by the Commission was denounced by
some gay leaders. Dick Dadey observed that a districting plan that
included half of Christopher Street in another district would "slice the
gay community in half," adding, "it goes right down the middle of the
most well-known gay street in the
The Commission was
under pressure from both the lesbian and gay community and parts of
the Asian-American community, demonstrating how districting can
pit one minority against another.
a. Potential Conflict between Asian Americans and Lesbians and
Gay Men
Chinatown, the least dispersed Asian-American community in
New York City,lso was the focus of the Commission's efforts to provide for representation for Asian Americans. "The problem with the
creation of a minority district on the Lower East Side was essentially
one of population: no matter how the Commission drew a district,
neither an Asian majority nor a Latino majority district could be created."151 Two alternatives emerged: one that would create a multi146. Except for the southern boundary, the preliminary proposal for District 3 followed the
ESPA proposal. See Bailey, supra note 94.
147. Felicia R. Lee, Blocs Battle, supra note 122.
148. Id.
149. Felicia R. Lee, Minority Districts Added for Council in New York Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2. 1991, at A l .
150. While Queens had twice the Asian population of Manhattan (175,064 in Queens, 88,825
in Manhattan), Manhattan had nearly twice the number of VTDs with 50% or more Asian
supra note 108, at Appendix I; Lee,
population. See Asian Population Report, in SUBMISSION,
supra note 122 ("Although there is a growing Korean population in the Flushing area of Queens,
the largest Asian-American concentration is still in Chinatown.").
151. Reed, supra note 90, at 772.
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ethnic district,lS2combining both the Latino and the Asian populations, and another that would combine the Asian population with the
largely white, upper-middle class Battery Park City.lS3 Various Chinese community leaders supported different ~ 1 a n s . lKen
~ ~ Chin, the
Commission's Asian-American member, eventually favored the Battery Park plan, thereby deciding the issue for the Commission. The
decision to connect working class Chinatown with affluent, white Battery Park City rather than with a working class Latino neighborhood
suggests that strange bedfellows can be created by the districting process. Blatant power brokering led to a situation where one person's
opinion determined Asian-American representation in the New York
City Council, and also led to several ensuing complications for the
Comrni~sion.'~~
To maximize Asian-American votes, the district was
crafted with a population close to the allowable minimum, leaving
other Manhattan districts with disproportionately larger populations
0vera1l.l~~
b. Working Relationship between Lesbians and Gays and
"Protected Minorities"
Lesbian and gay activists recognized their subordinate position in
the districting process, and attempted to avert any competition with
"protected" minorities. According to Gartner, "[the] understanding
on the part of the lesbian and gay community [was] that . . . if they
were in competition with [bllacks and Latinos that they would lose.
Fortunately the spatial demographics made that not a problem,"157 because blacks and Latinos made up a relatively low percentage of the
population of the downtown West Side of Manhattan below Harlem.
ESPA nonetheless developed a working relationship with minority
152. The multi-ethnic proposal was supported by the Asian-American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (AALDEF) and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
(PRLDEF), which based their arguments on the direction of growth of the Chinese community,
the common class identity of Chinese and Puerto Rican communities in the area, and the belief
that a minority representative would better address the needs of the minority population. See id.
at 773-74.
153. See id. at 774.
154. See Margaret Fung, A District Like a Mosaic, N . Y . NEWSDAY,Apr. 12, 1991, at 68
("Working class Asians and Latinos in this area have successfully united in the past to win affordable housing, health care, immigrant services, and bilingual education."). Asian-Americans
for Equality (AAFE) and their candidate and ex-president, Margaret Chin, supported the latter
plan. Id
155. See Reed, supra note 90, at 775 11.68.
156. Id. at 775 11.69.
157. See Gartner, supra note 133.
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communities that facilitated their efforts in two ways, according to
Alan Gartner, Executive Director of the Commission. First, recognizing the primacy of the rights of statutorily protected groups to representation, ESPA met with minority community leaderslS8to assuage
any fears that a lesbian and gay district would come at the expense of
a minority district. ESPA primarily allied itself with the Asian com-'
munity in an effort to defuse the tension between the two districts,
and to advocate for both relatively uncertain districts.159 This coalition-centered advocacy avoided last-minute "gay bashing" by the supporters of the multi-ethnic Chinatown proposal.160 The fact that
lesbians and gays and racial and language minorities had a working
relationship was an encouraging sign. The two communities, facing
the distinct possibility of no representation at all, recognized the need
to work together and signaled the ability of oppressed groups to unite
for structurally aligned projects and goals.
The Commission ultimately responded to lesbian and gay activists' demands, and moved the southern boundary of District 3 to
Houston Street, drawing population for the Chinatown district from
other areas of the city. The formation of District 3 led to the election
of an openly gay and HIV-positive candidate, Thomas K. Duane.161
158. See GARTNER,supra note 109, at 132.
159. See Richard Dadey, Address to the Districting Commission (Mar. 27,1991) (on file with
author) (discussing the proposed lesbian and gay district in West Village and Chelsea: "It is
important to note that this district is drawn with sensitivity to, and respect for, the efforts currently underway to create an Asian-American [dlistrict in lower Manhattan and a Latino district
in the lower East Side."); Richard Dadey, Address to the Districting Commission (May 8,1991)
(on file with author) ("[Llet me say that we remain committed to the idea of an Asian-American
district in lower Manhattan.").
160. GARTNER,supra note 109, at 134.
161. Thomas K. Duane, candidate for the seat in 1989, faced Liz Abzug in the primary. Ms.
Abzug, the daughter of pioneer feminist politician Bella Abzug, was not known as a lesbian
activist before her race. For a colorful description of this heated race to be the first city
councilperson from the "gay district," see Alessandra Stanley, Race Is Likely to Yield First Gay
Member of Council, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 10, 1991, at B1. The New York Post, a conservative tabloid, commented on the race:
There may be no more apt symbol of the direction of contem orary New York politics
than Liz Abzug having to dlscuss her sexual orientation wit newspaper reporters in
the context of announcing her candida for the "gay seat" in the newly redistricted
and enlarged City Council. In a saner ztical culture, what one does in one's bedroom
might be thought to have nothing to o with one's suitability to serve in public office.
Balkanizing the City Council, N.Y. POST, June 7, 1991, at 34. Earlier, the Post accused Ms.
Abzug of "coming out" for political expediency. See Joe Nicholson, Abzug's Daughter, in Bid
for Council, Reveals: I'm Gay, N.Y. POST,June 4, 1991, at 2 (reporting that "[Ms. Abzug] denied
reports she delayed coming out until the new City Council districting plain joined Greenwich
Village with heavily gay Chelsea. Sources said she had planned to run as a heterosexual if her
district included Chinatown and TriBeCa [both non-gay neighborhoods]."). At the same time
Ms. Abzug came out, Mr. Duane came out about his HIV status. Faced with the threat of being
"outed" as such, Mr. Duane held a press conference to make his announcement, thus becoming

K
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Conversely, Asian Americans for Equality, after winning the battle
over boundaries for District 1 against those who supported a multiethnic district, watched their candidate and former leader lose to the
white incumbent.162
6. The Nonexistent Brooklyn Lesbian and Gay District
While ESPA had a great deal of support for the creation of its
district, Lambda Independent Democrats (LID), Brooklyn's lesbian
and gay political club, did not fare as well. Lesbians and gays were
unsuccessful in asserting their rights in Brooklyn, where more blacks
and Latinos lived, indicating the underlying subordination of lesbian
and gay interests to the interests of people of color in a districting
system mandated by the Voting Rights Act. LID had a far more difficult time trying to convince the Commission to create a lesbian and
gay district in Brooklyn, partially because their claim was bolstered by
less convincing statistics than those ESPA had available to support its
cause.163 LID'S proposal would have united the "Brownstone Belt"
that surrounds downtown Brooklyn, Brooklyn Heights, Boerum Hill,
and Park Slope. To support its assertion that a lesbian and gay community existed in Brooklyn, LID used statistics based on its own
membership list, information concerning certain women's groups in
Brooklyn, and data extracted from certain nightclub 1 i ~ t s .LID
l ~ ~ even
employed mailing lists of some city-wide groups such as Frontrunners,
a lesbian and gay joggers' club, and of local groups such as Brooklyn
Lesbians Together.16= These lists constituted the sole evidence
presented in support of the proposed lesbian and gay district in
Brooklyn.
the first known seropositive candidate for elected office in New York. See Maurice Carroll,
Council Candidate: I'm HIV-Positive, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Au& 9, 1991, at 8; Alessandra Stanley,
Gay Candidate for City Council Says He Has AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMES,Aug. 8, 1991, at B1.
162. Although Asian Americans For Equality won the districting issue, their candidate, Margaret Chin, lost the primary and the election to the incumbent, Kathryn Freed. Judith Reed
explains this defeat by pointing out that
[o]f the total population in this district. 37% is non-minority, 6% is African-American,
17% is Latino, and 39% is Asian-American. However, at the estimated registration
level Asian-Americans are only 14% of the district wh~lewhites are 61.5%. Ironically,
there was a greater percentage of Latino registered voters (15.5%)than Asian-Arnerican (14%) in this so-called Asian district.
See Reed, supra note 90, at 774 n.67.
163. For a description of the materials LID presented to the Commission, see George Waffle,
Testimony before the New York City Districting Commission (Feb. 20, 1991) (on file with
author).
164. See Bailey, supra note 94.
165. Id.

'
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Unlike ESPA, LID had no institutional maps or electoral records
to bolster their case. "The presentation was not as good in Brooklyn
[as in Manhattan] largely because the facts are so different-there was
no electoral evidence, just assertions on the part of community members that they were entitled to representation. It looked thin compared to the impressiveness of Manhattan[% pre~entation]."'~~
Another difficulty LID faced was that the proposed lesbian and gay
district in Brooklyn traversed several incumbent fiefs16' and minority
communities. The plan adopted by the Commission split Park Slope,
the center of Brooklyn's lesbian and gay community, into three parts.
One part joined progressive Brooklyn Heights and conservative Williamsburgh. Another part joined Sunset Park and Boerum Hill, while
the central part of the lesbian and gay community was joined with
Borough Park and conservative Carroll Gardens to form District
39."j8 The result of splitting the lesbian and gay community among
three districts was the fracturing of the lesbian and gay community's
voting strength, effectively destroying any possibility that lesbians and
gays from this area could elect a representative of their choice.
Lesbians and gays were not the only group to suffer from fracturing. Brooklyn's twenty-percent Latino population was so dispersed
that Latinos only received one safe district out of seventeen. The effort to create a second majority-Latino district in Brooklyn further
split Park Slope's lesbian and gay community. Although a New York
Times commentator blamed the Brooklyn Democratic machine for
this under-repre~entation,'~~
it seems clear that the dispersed nature
of Brooklyn's Latino population complicated efforts to achieve effective representation in the districting system. One LID member testified: "We have no intention of diluting any other minority districts
166. Gartner, supra note 133.
167. Incumbency was a far thornier issue in Brooklyn where, in order to create a new white
district, Orthodox Jewish-supported Councilpetson Susan Alter was drawn into the district of
the other Orthodox Jewish-supported Councilpetson, Noach Dear. See Jack Newfield, Hidden
Agendas Ruled, Council Gerrymandered, N.Y. TIMES,June 24, 1991, at 10. One Districting
Commission member, Luther Blake, stated: "To claim discrimination when there are two Jews in
the same district is absurd . . . . If we had drawn one of them [Noach Dear or Susan Alter] into
Bed-Stuy [Bedford-Stuyvesant, an African-American neighborhood], they would have an argument." Frank Lombardi & Ruth Landa, Vallone is Crying Foul: Sees Anti-White District Push,
N.Y. DAILYNEWS,June 3,1991, at 7. Ms. Alter challenged the lines on the basis of "reverse
discrimination." See Newfield, supra. Ms. Alter filed suit against the Commission and the Council, which led to the opening of all districts to all candidates residing in the jurisdiction, regardless of the district in which they resided. See Reed, supra note 105.
168. See Telephone Interview with George Waffle, Lambda Independent Democrats (May 7,
1994) (on file with author).
169. See Newfield, supra note 166.
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. . . . We must also recognize that the gay and lesbian community includes people of all colors."170
The Commission essentially ignored the LID proposal, as one activist remarked, "The Commission seems to have created a new mandate-'one incumbent, one district'-at the expense of the lesbian
and gay com~nunity.""~Incumbency joined with competing interests
of other minorities to fracture the Brooklyn lesbian and gay
community.
Despite their lack of representation in the City Council, Brooklyn's lesbian and gay voters turned out at the polls to express their
interests in the highly contested 1993 School Board e1e~tions.l'~As a
result, openly lesbian and gay candidates, as well as candidates supportive of the lesbian and gay community overwhelmingly won the
e1ecti0n.l'~
7. Representation Results

a. Community Reaction
Many in the lesbian and gay community lauded the Commission's
creation of a lesbian and gay district in Manhattan. Lesbian and gay
satisfaction with the Commission's plan provided a counterpoint to
widespread discontent among . other community fa~ti0ns.l'~ Outweek,175which then had the largest circulation of any New York lesbian and gay magazine, pointed out in an editorial entitled, The Case
of the Missing Districts, that:
170. George Waffle, Address to the Districting Commission (Feb. 20, 1991) (on file with
author).
171. George Waffle, Address to the Districting Commission (May 7, 1991) (on file with
author).
172. Indeed, the entire slate supported by ESPA in the elections won. Jon Nalley, who ran as
the leader of a lesbian and gay slate in Chelsea and West Village, received the largest number of
votes of any candidate in the City's history. See Sam Dillon, New York City's 32 School Boarh
Get New Faces but Not New Views, N.Y. TIMES,May 22,1993, 9 1, at 1. For a fuller discussion of
this election, see Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests Through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 119-20 (1996).
173. The system used by the Board of Elections is the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system. See Martin Gottlieb, The 'Golden Age' of the Ciry Council, N.Y. TIMES,June 11,1991.P 4,
at 6.
174. See Felicia R. Lee, Plan for New Ciry Council Parses in Praise and Anger, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1991, at B1 ("Not everyone was displeased with the plan. [ESPA] . . . applauded a
Manhattan Council district that includes the West Village and Chelsea, and that they said could
be won by a gay candidate.").
175. Ounveek gained national notoriety as the center of the "outing" wave practiced primarily by Michaelangelo Signorile, who penned the infamous article that "outed" Malcolm Forbes.
See Michaelangelo Signorile, The Other Side of Malcolm, OUTWEEK,
Mar. 18,1990, at 40.
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[Llesbians and gays, with at least ten percent of the city's population, deserve at least five [seats on the City Council] . . . . [Tlhe
prevailing notion [is] that gay-winnable districts, having not been
specifically mandated by the new charter, are an afterthought, a
bone to throw our community. This leads commissioners to feel
that if lesbians and gays are granted one such district, we should be
more than satisfied. We should be grateful.
The commissioners should think again. The day is long since
past when we thought of ourselves as beggars at the gate of municipal government. We are full voting members of the city. we pay
more than our fair share of taxes, we demand at least our fair share
of repre~entati0n.l'~
Brooklyn advocates were certainly disappointed by the Commission's
refusal to create the Brownstone Belt distri~t."~One response to the
plan pointed out that no one on the Commission was lesbian or gay,
and that the Commission's composition hurt the general lesbian and
gay effort.178
C. California State Legislative Districting
California, like New York, is home to a sizeable number of lesbian and gay communities, most notably the one located in San Francisco. During the wave of lesbian and gay community building in the
mid-1970's, Harvey Milk, leader of San Francisco's gay community,
ran for the Board of Supervisors. In San Francisco's pre-1977 winnertakes-all at-large system, representatives were chosen by a city-wide
majority. Although a sizable ~ninority,l'~
lesbians and gays were unable to elect a representative.'" Here, as elsewhere in the country, atlarge elections led to the systematic exclusion of minorities from government. A grassroots social reform movement led by racial and ethnic minorities, lesbian and gay people, and unions won a referendum
176. The Case of the Missing Districts, OUTWEEK,May 1. 1991, at 4.
177. See. e.g., George Waffle,Address to the Districting Commission (May 29.1991) (on file
with author).
178. See id. ("We have also noticed that the Commission itself does not contain an openly
lesbian or gay man. This we believe has hurt us in our attempts to receive adequate
representation.").
179. At the time, the police chief estimated lesbian and gay San Franciscans to number
140,000, one-fifth of the city's population. See RANDYSHILTS,
THEMAYOROF CASTRO
STREET:
THELIFEAND TIMESOF HARVEYMILK225 (1982).
supra note 85, at 144.
180. See CASTELLS,
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to adopt a districting system.lS1 Harvey Milk182easily won election as
Supervisor for the first "gay district"lS3 in the country.la
Today, the entire Bay Area and sections of Southern California
are home to several prominent lesbian and gay communities; yet lesbians and gays, as a group, lack representation in the state legislature.
WESPAC, the Western States Conference of Gay and Lesbian Political Action Committees, commissioned a study that documented the
location of California's lesbian and gay population.185 The study used
several of the methods being employed at that time in New York, adding one painful, yet accurate statistical marker for the gay population.lg6 As the San Francisco Chronicle reported:
Finding gay voters is not an exact science, since the census doesn't
ask about sexual orientation. To locate their people, WESPAC used
such factors as vote patterns in supervisor races where gay candidates were running and gayllesbian mailing lists. But the WESPAC
map that shows most clearly how a gay district would be drawn is
one that shows the number of AIDS cases in each neighborhood
. . . . There just might be enough voters . . . to form the heart of a
372,000-person State Assembly district, though probably not
enough for a congressional seat or State Senate district, which take
more people.ls7
In support of this statistical evidence, San Francisco Supervisor Carole
Migden decried the lack of a lesbian and gay district before the State
Assembly: "This under-representation-like that of other minority
groups-is in large part due to district lines that, either intentionally
or thoughtlessly, dilute our community's voting power."lg8 San Diego's City Council joined WESPAC in its effort to gain representation
for the various lesbian and gay communities in the state legi~lature.'~~
181. See SHILTS,
supra note 178, at 152.
182. For an excellent biography of this lionized gay politician, who stated before his assassination: "If a bullet should enter my brain, let that bullet destroy every closet door," see SHILTS,
supra note 178.
183. A "gay" district is one whose representative could be chosen by lesbian and gay people
alone, even if, for example, they constituted 51% of the district.
184. See SHILTS,
supra note 178, at 152.
185. Vlae Kershner, Cynical or Sincere?, S.F. CHRON.,Aug. 24, 1991, at A14.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Hearing on Redistricting Identification of Communities of Interest in the Greater Bay
Area, and Santa Clara and Monterey Counties Before the California State Assembly Committee
on Elections, Reapportionment and Constitutional Amendments, July 11,1991 (testimony of Carole Migden), quoted in Tim Schreiner. Gays, Lesbians Want United Dinrict: Supervisor Testifies
July 12, 1991, at A17.
at Assembly Hearing on Redistricting, S.F. CHRON.,
189. See Barry M. Horstman, Political Map's Challenge Is to Color It by the Numbers; Redistricting: Environmentalists, Gays and Ethnic Groups All Have Their Own Proposals for Redraw-
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In spite of the strong efforts of lesbian and gay rights advocates in
California, no lesbian and gay district was created. California's failure
to provide lesbians and gays with opportunities for representation
when it created its state legislature districts was the subject of William
Kysella's article, Gerrymandering Against Gays,19" in which he argued:
[Gays] could not influence the political process effectively because
the districts were drawn to split their influence, usually between two
districts, leaving them with less influence in two or more districts
rather than substantial influence in one district. This scenario was
repeated in the gay communities in San Francisco, West Hollywood,
Long Beach and San Diego. Furthermore, there is evidence that
polarized voting has occurred in some of these districts in elections
involving gay candidates and issues, plus there is evidence of continuing anti-gay sentiment in political campaigns throughout the
state.lgl

Thus, despite the evidence gathered by lesbian and gay advocates
in California, anti-gay forces prevented lesbians and gays from achieving the representation they deserve. Kysella argues that lesbians and
gays have an Equal Protection claim in California. Davis v.
Bandemer,lg2the definitive case on gerrymandering, recognizes that a
constitutional issue exists when a districting plan "operate[s] to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population."lg3 Kysella argues that in order to qualify for
equal protection coverage under Davis, three issues must be addressed and satisfied: (1) lesbians and gays must have a justiciable
claim; (2) they must constitute a politically identifiable group; and (3)
their population numbers must be significant enough to merit
protection.lg4
To demonstrate the presence of justiciability, Kysella points to
the fact that sexual orientation is immutable, subjecting lesbians and
gays to the same or an essentially similar stigma faced by racial
Using community-based statistics, Kysella points to the aping City Council District Boundaries, L.A. TIMES,
July 8, 1990, at B1 (quoting one gay activist as
stating that the redistricting plan was a "homophobic effort . . to divide and conquer" the
lesbian and gay vote by fracturing it).
190. See William H. Kysella, Gerrymandering Against Gays?, 4 L. & SEXUALITY:
A REV.OF
LESBIAN
AND GAYLEGALISSUES 249,262-70 (1994).
191. Id.
192. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
193. Id. at 119.
194. Kysella, supra note 189.
195. Id.

.
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parent concentration of lesbian and gays in San Francisco and Southem California as indicating that members of the lesbian and gay
population constitute an identifiable political group in the state.
Kysella builds on this by arguing that there is discrimhatory intent
and effect inherent in California's exclusion of lesbians and gays from
representation in the state legislature, and that in order to withstand
an equal protection challenge, this discrimination must survive a legitimate state-interest test. Kysella demonstrates discriminatory intent
by showing that lesbian and gay voters were excluded from the districting process for California's state legislature. The polarization
around lesbian and gay issues and candidates in California, and the
resulting exclusion of lesbian and gay people from the political process, also signal discriminatory effect.lg6
D. Texas Lesbian and Gay Districting
Texas, like California, has two major concentrations of lesbians
and gays, one located in Houston and the other located in Dallas. In
Houston, lesbians and gays faced a situation similar to the one lesbians and gays encountered in Brooklyn, New York. The well-known
lesbian and gay community, located predominantly in the Montrose
section of Houston, was considered the center of "the bellweather gay
vote."lg7 Houston, like New York, accepted community redistricting
plans from the public. The Houston Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus
submitted a redistricting plan for the city which surpassed that of New
York's Empire State Pride Agenda by including a complete redistricting plan for Houston that accounted for the Voting Rights Act Section
5 requirements,lg8 a gesture of solidarity with other minorities.
Based on evidence similar to that used by ESPA in New York, the
plan proposed by Houston's lesbian and gay community utilized both
voting records on lesbian and gay issues and candidates and membership maps compiled from information obtained from various community groups.lg9 In the mid-1980s, Houston held a referendum on
lesbian and gay employment discrimination protection which failed to
196. See generally Davis, 478 U.S. at 119. But see James Rainey & Greg Krikorian, Voters
Sweep Our Two Council Incumbents, L.A. TIMES,
June 9, 1993, at A1 (reporting that Tom
LaBonge was elected as the Los Angeles City Council's first openly gay councilmember).
197. See Telephone Interview with Annise Parker, former candidate for Houston City Council (Oct. 10, 1995) (on file with author).
198. See Telephone Interview with Robert Bridges, consultant to the Houston Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus (Oct. 31, 1995) (on file with author).
199. See id.
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gain voter support. Maps indicating areas of support for the referendum proved particularly helpful in establishing the existence of a lesbian and gay community.200 Robert Bridges, a consultant to the
Houston Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus, has asserted that "the
plan was based primarily on election returns rather than mailing lists
because you can have a pocket of lesbian and gay people on a list but
that doesn't necessarily show support for lesbian and gay candid a t e ~ . "The
~ ~ plan,
~
the first submitted to the Council for consideration in effecting the 1990 census redistricting, received a great deal of
notice and "support from other [Asian, Hispanic, and black] community groups looking to protect our interests as well as theirs."202
Unfortunately, Houston's City Council which, unlike New York,
voted directly on redistricting, rejected all the proposed plans submitted, including the one proposed by the Houston Gay and Lesbian
Political Caucus. The Montrose area, a progressive white area that is
adjacent to black neighborhoods, provided district line drawers with a
population that couId be used to "unpack" black districts-that is, to
reduce black percentages in districts to achieve effective black majorities in the greatest number of
In unpacking its black districts, the City Council split the lesbian and gay Montrose area.
Unlike New York, which had an independent districting comrnission, Houston's City Council drew the lines for its own districts, giving
councilmembers free rein to draw districts in such a way as to protect
their incumbencies.204 In this regard, Montrose ended up like Park
Slope, Brooklyn-divided into several districts designed to protect incumbencies and provide racial minorities with effective majorities.
Houston's mixed districting and at-large system, in which five of
the fourteen city councilmembers are elected by a city-wide vote, prevents the city council districts from being small enough to afford the
lesbian and gay community a winnable
Furthermore, several local activists assert that the City Council knew Montrose was the
most concentrated lesbian and gay area but ignored this fact to favor
councilmembers'
Here, self-serving political inter200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id.

Id.
See id
See id
See id
See id.
See id
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ests conveniently ignored common knowledge of a community's
existence.
According to Annise Parker, an openly lesbian former candidate
for a seat on the Houston City Council:
The Councilmembers decided which district got swapped for which.
We did all the lobbying and came up with alternative plans, but it
wasn't a question of where the community was located but whether
it was important to provide it with representation. Rather than acting out of homophobia, they were acting to protect their own
incumbency.207

The failure of the lesbian and gay community to win a district in
Houston demonstrates the limitations of community-based evidence
when there is an absence of political will and leadership to represent
the minority group. In situations such as that encountered by gay and
lesbian advocates in Houston, gay and lesbian voters will be "camibalizedM208by incumbency, heterosexism, and other forces.
Other
Texans have had greater success in electing representatives supporting
lesbian and gay interests. Voters in one Austin district have elected
openly gay Representative Glen Maxey to the State L e g i ~ l a t u r e . ~ ~ ~
Although the district has many lesbian and gay residents, Representative Maxey's supporters include the broader liberal population of
Democrats and people associated with the University of Texas210 As
a state legislator, Representative Maxey has advocated for same-sex
marriage and the repeal of Texas' sodomy law.''
Dallas lesbians and gay men have helped to elect two gay men,
Craig McDaniel and Chris Luna, to the fourteen-member Dallas City
C o u n ~ i l . ' ~In~ Dallas' 1991 redistricting, black and Latino districts
were drawn first.213 Although lesbians and gay men constitute approximately 15-25% of Luna's district,214it was designed as a Latino207. Id.
208. "We gay area in Houston was cannibalized by the districting process. Where they had a
gay majority district, it was cut up by the City Council." Telephone Interview with Glen Maxey,
State Representative from Austin, Texas (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file wlth author).
209. See e.g., Glen Maxey, Running Against the Right, in GAYAND LESBIANVICTORY FUND,
supra note 12, at 159; Maxey, supra note 207.
210. Maxey, supra note 207.
211. Sylvia Moreno, Gay Legislator Seeks Sodomy Law Repeal, DALLASMORNING
NEWS,
Feb. 4, 1993, at 30A.
212. Telephone Interview with Dallas City Councilperson Craig McDaniel (Nov. 14, 1995)
(on file with author); Telephone Interview with Dallas City Councilperson Chris Luna (Jan. 30,
1996) (on file with author).
213. McDaniel, supra note 211; Luna, supra note 211.
214. Luna's district incorporates part of Oak Lawn, the most well-known lesbian and gay
neighborhood in Dallas, as well as East Dallas, another lesbian and gay neighborhood.
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majority district, with 65% Latinos. In 1991, after the district was
drawn, all three candidates for the office were Latino, including
L ~ n a . Latinos
~ l ~ did play an important role in electing Luna, but their
low voter registration and low voter turnout permitted lesbian and gay
voters to have a disproportionate influence on the election of the district's councilperson, helping to re-elect him in 1993 and 1995. Luna's
district has a solid lesbian and gay influence, in which lesbians and gay
men have important, if not exclusive, sway over their representation.
This influence exists not only because of the disproportionate weight
of the lesbian and gay vote, but because of the lack of hostility within
the majority Latino pop~lation.~'~
McDaniel, elected in 1993, represents a district that incorporates
some inner-city areas and Oak Lawn, Dallas' most well-known lesbian
and gay area.*'' His district, whose population is estimated to be 1520% lesbian and gay, was created after the 1990 census to elect a progressive, perhaps lesbian or gay, candidate.218 Districting advocates
developed and employed zip-code-based maps showing concentrations of membership in lesbian and gay political and social organizations, including the Dallas Lesbian and Gay Alliance, and the nation's
largest Metropolitan Community church, which is a lesbian and gay
Because the lesbian and gay area, according to that map,
was largely within the Democratic precincts, Democratic district lines
specifically aided lesbian and gay representation. In 1993, in his first
campaign, McDaniel's organization contacted lesbian and gay voters
with specially tailored voting pitches to capitalize on the lesbian and
gay population's political involvement.220With broad lesbian and gay
and Democratic support, McDaniel easily won both the 1993 and 1995
Having one-seventh of the council's representation, Dallas' lesbian and gay communities have an important voice in local politics.
Council-appointed commissions are well-populated by lesbians and
gays. This involvement by lesbians and gay men permits them a
strong voice in current policy debates while further opening the way
for lesbian and gay civic activism.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Luna, supra note 211.
Id.
Lori Stahl, Council Members Take Oath, DALLAS
MORNINONEWS,June 8,1993, at 17A.
McDaniel, supra note 211.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, in New York, Texas, and California, advocates for lesbian
and gay representation have, with varying degrees of success, employed similar methods to identify their communities for districting
purposes: maps depicting previous electoral support for lesbian and
gay interests; maps reflecting community group member lists; and
maps reflecting the locations of lesbian and gay businesses and community institutions. Although these techniques ultimately resulted in
the creation of several districts representing lesbians and gay men,
they did not always overcome the opposing forces-ranging from indifference to hostility-arrayed against lesbian and gay communities.
While effective for their purpose, these techniques must be viewed as
mere tools for use in overcoming the representational problems posed
for minority groups by a districting system, rather than a solution to
the problems themselves.
111. REPRESENTING RACIAL MINORITIES THROUGH
LESBIAN AND GAY DISTRICTING TECHNIQUES
Miller has in some sense reversed the situation described in the
above examples. Where lesbian and gay districts were previously
slated only after the "protected" minority districts were drawn, racial
minorities will no longer have necessary primacy over "unprotected"
groups such as lesbians and gays. Theoretically, unlike blacks,.who
can no longer rely on their race alone to attain primacy in the districting process, lesbian and gay community interests may be permitted to
influence districting decisions without leading to a potentially successful Shaw claim.
Undoubtedly, blacks still face fundamental electoral challenges
from the racist elements in our society and our governmental system.
Despite Miller and the partial success of the effort to dismantle the
Voting Rights Act, however, blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities are in a comparatively well-established position as far as the districting of their communities is concerned. Blacks will not likely
confront the complete indifference lesbians and gays suffer in areas
like Houston, because such egregious treatment of a racial minority
likely would still constitute a basis for a successful Section 2 or Section
5 claim under the Voting Rights Act. In that regard, the difficulties
lesbians and gays have encountered in their efforts to achieve districting rights through the use of community-based evidence would not
plague blacks and other racial minorities.
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As was argued in Section One, community statistics will most effectively meet the Miller standard. This Section will apply the lesbian
and gay districting experience to black electoral questions. It will explore the non-biological, cultural nature of racial identity, a conception that fits well with the "community" standard of Miller. It then
will suggest how evidence of black communities may meet the Miller
standard.
A. The Utility of A Cultural Definition of Race

Many black theorists argue for a cultural definition of racial identity. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., points out that " '[rlace' as a meaningful
criterion within the biological sciences has long been recognized to be
a fi~tion."~'' Kwame Anthony Appiah also argues that the notion
that race is a biological trait is merely a cultural construct, and that
Having no relevant biologirace is in fact a "metonym for
cal meaning, "race" is merely a substitute for "culture. "224 The misperception that "race" is more than "culture" comes from an interest
in the upholding power differentials: "[rlace has become a trope of
ultimate, irreducible difference between cultures, linguistic groups, or
practitioners of specific belief systems, who more often than not have
fundamentally opposed economic interests."us The notion that race
carries some real meaning apart from culture is thus rooted in social
conflict. The theoretical presumption that "race" has greater meaning
is accomplished in part by language: "we carelessly use language in
such a way as to will this sense of natural difference into our

formulation^."^^^
Appiah's concept of race may be akin to ethnicity-both ethnic
and racial identities have import because of their cultural content.
Because racial community is really cultural community, "Appiah believes that culture can and should substitute for race. "227 In addition
to commonalities of cultural expression and social constructions, black
cultural community stems from the perception by blacks and non222. HENRYLOUISGATES,JR., LOOSECANONS:NOTESON THE CULTURE
WARS48 (1992).
223. KWAME
ANTHONYAPPIAH,IN MY FATHER'SHOUSE:AFRICAIN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF
CULTURE
45 (1992).
224. The accuracy of Appiah's concept is beyond the swpe of this article. Regardless of the
accuracy of his assessment of the nature of race, however, the concept is useful for the rhetoric
of districting disputes.
225. GATES,supra note 221, at 53.
226. Id.
227. Chong-Soon Lee, supra note 10, at 771.
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blacks that they are part of a common race, and that this commonality
is used by others as a basis for discrimination.228
This vision of race as a fundamentally cultural rather than biological phenomenon would prove advantageous if it were adopted by the
Supreme Court. Because the Miller ruling-according to Justice
Ginsburg's dissent-has placed blacks beneath ethnic groups for districting considerations, the recategorization of black identity as an
ethnicity would permit blacks to skirt the Supreme Court's latest demotion based on its misguided adherence to racelessness.
Yet black advocates have emphasized cultural identity in districting disputes without succeeding in changing the Court's mind.22" The
Supreme Court has historically refused to recognize the cultural aspects of race, or to acknowledge that race may be a cultural construction.=O Neil Gotanda discusses culture-race, which "includes, for
example, the customs, beliefs, and intellectual and artistic traditions of
Black America, and institutions such as Black churches and coll e g e ~ . " ~ Gotanda
~'
points out that despite the applicability of "culture-race" to juridical discourse, "the Court has devalued or ignored
Black culture, community, and consciousness. Its opinions use the
same categorical name-Black-to
designate reified systemic subordination . . . as well as the cultural richness that defines culturerace."232 Blindness toward the cultural aspects of race is typified by
the Court's rulings in Shaw and Miller, both of which presume that
blacks living in similar contexts share no commonalities; shared identity must be proven as if race did not exist.
Despite convincing evidence that the Supreme Court "simply
lack[s] the imagination"233to consider cultural aspects of race, its
nearly absolute avoidance of such arguments may change. First, faced
with the new ineffectivenessof census-based district drawing, renewed
focus on cultural aspects of race may help persuade otherwise hostile
courts to permit the creation of majority-black districts. Second, the
Justices may be swayed that race's cultural implications are determinative. In his Shaw dissent, Justice Souter indicates that for him, race
has different meanings in different contexts, stating:
228. APPIAH,
supra note 222, at 17.
229. Chong-Soon Lee, supra note 10.
230. Id.
231. Gotanda, supra note 9, at 56.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 58.
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[Ellectoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require
some consideration of race for legitimate reasons . . . [because]
members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit
in our ability to talk about concepts like "minority voting strength,"
and "dilution of minority votes.9,234
In his dissent, Justice Souter "implicitly acknowledges that there are
affirmative definitions and uses of race."235 In addition, Justice
O'Connor's Miller concurrence argues that Miller should not destabilize the district lines of most jurisdictions. If other jurisdictions follow Georgia's response to Miller-reducing black majority districts by
t~o-thirds~~~-Justice
O'Connor may well attempt some retreat from
Miller's impact, possibly incorporating a recognition of black cultural
realities. Third, since the Court's view of cultural aspects of race is
more an attitude than a legal doctrine, District and Circuit courtsupon whom the bulk of districting enforcement relies-may be more
responsive to litigants' efforts to define race in a different fashion.

B. Identifying Black Communities of Culture
Blacks and other racial minorities can take hope from the successes of lesbians and gays in attaining representation using community information that might be favored under the new Miller regime.
Now minorities must prove the existence of a "community" interest
within a majority-minority district to defeat a claim that race was the
predominant factor in the districting process. In this sense, the Court
now requires blacks to jump over higher hurdles than was required
pre-Miller: they cannot just be black, they must also satisfy the Court's
notion of "community" in order to merit a majority-minority district.
But what constitutes a "black community"? The presence of community markers such as black-owned businesses and black political
groups and churches might serve to signal where a black district might
be drawn without violating the Miller racelessness presumption, as
would an emphasis on the various black ethnicities such as West Indian, Haitian, African-American, Hispanic blacks, etc. As mere argumentation before districting bodies, this method would not imply any
disunity in black political activity.
234. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
235. See Chong-Soon Lee, supra note 10, at 778.
236. Kevin Sack, Court Draws Georgia Map of Congressional Districts: 2 of 3 Black-Majorify
Districu Scrapped, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1995, at A22.
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The community-based districting evidence utilized by lesbian and
gay groups to gain representation in the electoral districting system
could be easily gathered for black communities. Given the historically
and contemporarily important role black churches play in the lives of
the members of black ~ornrnunities,2~~
church membership could serve
as the centerpiece of evidence for the creation of a district with a
black majority. As church organizations played a key role in the battle in the movement for voting rights in Selma, Alabama that led to
the passage of the Voting Rights
SO black churches now can
serve to provide support for districting advocates.239 Black political
groups, such as local chapters of the NAACP, could provide membership lists to districting advocates to establish the location and existence of a black community, relieving the black community of the need
to resort to census statistics. Further evidence of a black political
community could be provided by maps detailing support for candidates from that particular black community or support for black-related issues. Community groups, such as block associations and other
local groups, also might provide evidence of a particular community's
existence. Finally, commercial information might serve as ammunition against those who would argue that the only commonality among
voters in a black district is their race. Marketing surveys and other
documentation of black consumers, along with the identification of
black-owned businesses, would assist in proving the commonalities of
black communities. Evidence of this type may prove to be the only
remaining tool black communities have available to protect their
hard-won representation from Shaw-Millerchallenges.

237. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U . PA. L. REV.287,348 (1990) (citing the role of a black
church in the Civil Rights struggle of the 1960s); see alro, Gary Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought
111: Race Comciousness, 1990 DUKEL.J. 758,792 (1990) (citing the difference between blacks
and whites in their "different communities, neighborhoods, churches, families [and] histories").
238. See Bridge to Freedom, in THE EYESON THE PRIZECIVILRICKISREADER204-28
(Carson, et al. eds., 1991).
239. For a discussion of the potential role of black churches in political questions, see CORNEL WEST,On the Future of the Black Church, in PROPHE~C
R E F L E ~ O NNOTES
S:
ON RACE
AND POWER
IN AMERICA
73 (1993).
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CONCLUSION

Let us march on ballot boxes, until we send to our city
councils, state legislatures, and the United States
Congress (people] who will not fear to do
justice.240
The Supreme Court's tortured notions of minority representation and equal protection reveal the depths of districting's evils: as a
system, districting requires an elite group to draw districts, yet makes
no provisions for, and provides no safeguards against, political horsetrading and the potential conflicts of interest that accrete around incumbency. As a result of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause as requiring "colorblind" districting over
the interests of blacks, such elites will be free of the self-perceived
political shackles imposed by black representation. The Court has
transformed itself from an institution that ostensibly guarantees just
enforcement of constitutionally mandated protections for minorities
to one that overtly enforces the rhetoric of racelessness to ensure the
reality of racial excl~siveness.~~~
Both racial and sexual minorities come to the debate over political representation from positions of intense frustration with the legal
and political systems of the United States. Both groups clearly merit
far more representation in the political process than they currently
command or are likely to gain in the near future. A fairer system of
representation could be achieved by changing the system to allow proportional representation, which would enable all individuals to choose
political identification regardless of where they live within a jurisdiction. Despite a profound lack of faith in this majority-rule republic's
ability to respond to minority needs, the hope that minorities might
someday achieve a fairer level of representation persists. Against the
critical weaknesses of districting and its current jurisprudence, racial
and sexual minorities must discover new methods that will allow them

240. Martin LutherKing, Jr., OURGODIS MARCHING
ON,Speech to the Selma marchers in
front of the Alabama State Capitol (March 25,1965), reprinted in THEEYESON THE PRIZECIVIL
RIGHTSREADER,
supra note 237, at 224.
241. For an analysis of the Court's 1994 Term and the disappearance of the Court's "center,"
July 2, 1995, O 4 at 1.
see Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y. T~MES,
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to participate in the political system, or risk being forced to withdraw
from the American democratic experiment.242

242. See generally HANNAH
ARENDT,ON R E V O L U ~ O N(1963) (discussing the radical nature
of the American Revolution and postulating that the institution of American government has
prevented any further American revolutions).
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